



ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN DEATHS AT THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN AND RELATED MATTERS.

> Hearing held 8th floor 180 Dundas Street West Toronto, Ontario

The Honourable Mr. Justice S.G.M. Grange

Commissioner

P.S.A. Lamek, Q.C.

Counsel

E.A. Cronk

Associate Counsel

Thomas Millar

Administrator

Transcript of evidence for

9 May 1984

VOLUME 143


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ROYAL COMMISSION OF INOUIRY INTO CERTAIN DEATHS AT THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN 2 AND RELATED MATTERS. 3 4 Hearing held on the 8th Floor, 180 Dundas Street West, Toronto, 5 Ontario, on Wednesday, the 9th day of May, 1984. 6 7 8 9 THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.M. GRANGE - Commissioner 10 THOMAS MILLAR - Administrator MURRAY R. ELLIOT - Registrar 11 12 13 APPEARANCES: 14 Commission Counsel P.S.A. LAMEK, Q.C. 15 E. CRONK 16 D. HUNT Counsel for the Attorney General and L. CECCHETTO 17 Solicitor General of Ontario (Crown Attorneys and Coroner's 18 Office) 19 Counsel for The I.G. SCOTT, Q.C. I. J. ROLAND Hospital for Sick 20 Children M. THOMSON R. BATTY 21 B. PERCIVAL, Q.C. Counsel for The Metropolitan Toronto D. YOUNG 22 Police 23 Counsel for numerous K. CHOWN Doctors at The Hospital for Sick 24 Children

(Cont'd) ..



| 1 | APPEARANCES (Continued): | |
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| 6 | P. RAE | Counsel for Phyllis |
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| 9 | S. LABOW | Counsel for Mr. & Mrs. Gosselin, Mr. & Mrs. |
| 10 | | Gionas, Mr. & Mrs. Inwood, Mr. & Mrs. |
| 11 | | Turner, Mr. & Mrs. Lutes and Mr. & Mrs. Murphy |
| 12 | | (parents of deceased children) |
| 13 | F. J. SHANAHAN | Counsel for Mr. & Mrs. Dominic Lombardo |
| 14 | | (parents of deceased child Stephanie Lombardo) and Heather Dawson |
| 15 | | (mother of deceased child Amber Dawson) |
| 16 | W.W. TOBIAS | Counsel for Mr. & Mrs. |
| 17 | | Hines (parents of deceased child Jordan Hines) |
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| 19 | J. SHINEHOFT | Pacsai and Kevin Garnet (parents of deceased |
| 20 | | child Kevin Pacsai) |
| 21 | | |
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ERRATA

Volume 141

P. 2480, line 13: "with Frank" should read: "was frank"

P. 2554, line 12: "Mangaro" should read: "Mangera"



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
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A Statement of Claim and a Statement of Defence submitted by Mr. Percival





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
--- Upon commencing at 10:00 a.m.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sure that everybody knows what the problem is, but to give you some idea of what I am faced with I will just briefly describe it.

The Order in Council requires me, without expressing any conclusionable law regarding the civil or criminal responsibity in Phase II, to into, determine and report on the circumstances surrounding the investigation, institution and prosecution of charges arising out of the deaths of the above mentioned four infants. Those four infants are, of course, Janice Estrella, Kevin Pacsai, Allana Miller and Justin Cook and the prosecution they refer to is the prosecution of Susan Nelles that terminated with the preliminary enquiry.

Now, the problem arises out of the Court of Appeal decision and, in my view, particularly by the part that starts at the bottom of page 14, but the Order in Council specifically limits the Commissioner by forbidding him to express any conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal responsibility and then it says for a death or the deaths, because they were there dealing with Phase I.

In our opinion such a conclusion may





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be expressed by findings of fact, which without more when found against a named person constituted a conclusion of criminal or civil responsibility.

Now, I emphasize the word "civil" because in Phase II there is very little likelihood of criminal responsibility, but there is a good deal

The question, as I posed it, is found in the transcript on the 3rd of May, Volume 140, at

"Can I, in the light of the recent
Decision of the Court of Appeal,
receive evidence or submissions or
report on the propriety or otherwise
of the conduct of any person in the
course of the investigation and
prosecution."

Now, you will note that I have used or made a reference to evidence. It seems to me at the moment -- I haven't throught it thoroughly through -- that there is some justification in Phase I for receiving evidence that pointed to a perpetrator, because it might be also evidence as to the cause of death.

It is my present view that I can see no





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justification for receiving evidence on something upon which I cannot report in Phase II.

Now, I must say that I have no firm view on just what the position is, but I certainly have a firm view, and I would be happy to be dissuaded from on the question as to whether or not we will receive evidence if, in fact, I cannot report upon the question and that is going to make it, of course, thremely difficult and very limited if I can't report the propriety of anybody's conduct.

Now, I repeat again that I don't want to start Phase II until the matter is solved and that is why I want to take the first step in solving it today. If counsel are of the view that I cannot report on the propriety of anybody's conduct, I would like to have their recommendations for a solution if they think a solution is appropriate.

Now, I intend to hear from everybody if they want to make representations, regardless of whether they will obtain or even seeking standing in Phase II. I suggest only for convenience that we hear from Mr. Sopinka first, followed by Mr. Hunt, Mr. Percival, Mr. Scott and then anybody else who wants to address the matter I will hear about it.

I will ask Mr. Lamek at the end to





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resolve the problem. I think he will probably decline the offer, but I will at least give him the invitation. If you have any other order that you would like to go in, of course, it is perfectly satisfactory with me. If not, Mr. Sopinka, do you want to tell me what your views are.

MR. SOPINKA: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

First of all I would like to thank you for facilitating

attendance here this morning. They say this is a

commission of firsts. It is the first time a Trial

Judge has advised me that an adjournment, which I had

not requested, was granted.

Mr. Commissioner, the Order in Council, in my submission, authorizes two distinct enquiries to which fundamentally different principles apply.

We call them Phase I and Phase II. Phase I, of course, is in paragraph 3, Phase II in paragraph 4. The first Phase was how and by what means the children came to their deaths. The second Phase, the circumstances surrounding the investigation, institution and prosecution of Susan Nelles. The second Phase is an enquiry into the administration of justice in the Province. This is the enquiry that is described in the second recital or is foreshadowed in the second recital, whereas concern has been expressed concerning





the functioning of the justice system in respect of the instituting and prosecution of charges in relation to the said deaths.

The first Phase is the type of enquiry that potentially could become an extension of a police investigation or a prosecution, both of which under Federal jurisdiction.

With respect to that type of enquiry
there is a constitutional impediment. The decision
the Court of Appeal is that that potential of
transgressing on Federal jurisdiction would be
realized if names were named. The thing that saves
the Phase of the enquiry from being a transgression
on Federal jurisdiction is that names cannot be named.
There is no constitutional impediment with respect
to the first type of enquiry.

This dichotomy and the types of enquiry
was explained by Mr. Justice Estey in the Keable Case.

It was followed by Mr. Justice Martin in Hoffman-LaRoche.
That was the case that was extensively referred to in
the Court of Appeal and I am going to refer the
Court of Appeal Judgment in a moment.

In the Keable enquiry at page 190 Mr. Justice Estey said this, this is a passage that has been quoted to you before in these proceedings.

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"I do not read the Di Iorio case as going so far as to permit the invasion by Provincial action of the sanctity of the right to remain silent during what is in truth in substance a criminal investigation. The investigation of the incidents — the crime or the profile and characteristics of crime in a Province or the investigation of the operation of Provincial Agencies ..."

ess that.

"... or the investigation of the operation of Provincial Agencies in the field of law enforcement are quite different from the investigation of a precisely defined event or series of events with a view to criminal prosecution.

The first category may involve the investigation of crime generally and may be undertaken by the invocation of Provincial enquiry Statutes."

That is, there is no constitutional impediment.

"The second category entails the investigation of specific crime, the

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procedure for which has been established by Parliament and may not be circumvented by Provincial action under the general enquiry legislation any more than the substantive principles of criminal law may be so circumvented."

Legistal clear in the Court of Appeal Judgment

Mey were dealing with Phase I only and they were

lirecting their minds to the possibility -- this was

manual their minds to the possibility -- this was

manual there would be a constitutional impediment

meause then it would fall into the category mentioned

w Mr. Justice Estey in this Judgment.

Now, can I turn to the Court of Appeal Judgment and I know we have all read it. In order illustrate that this is what they did and I want read it again at page 9, starting at the top of the page:

"The statement of the Attorney
General as to the limitation on the
scope of a public enquiry was correct
and it is important. A public enquiry
is not the means by which investigations
are carried out with respect to the
commission of a particular crime or





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using his words, "deaths which are thought to have been the result of deliberate criminal acts by a person or persons unknown.

Such an enquiry is a coercive procedure and is quite incompatible with our notion of justice in the investigation of a particular crime and the determination of actual or probable criminal or civil responsibility."



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Now that term coercive procedure is taken right from Hoffman LaRoche because what Mr.

Justice Martin said in that case following what Mr.

Justice Estey said, is if you have an inquiry that is really an investigation of crime and suspects are ad to testify, then you really have a police investigation with the added element that people have to talk to the police, and that the province cannot

Now then he quotes Hoffman LaRoche which has much the same effect as the judgement of Mr.

this was approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Attorney General of Canada versus the Canadian National Transportation, and then the court goes on and this is the key passage:

"While the constitutional validity of the Order in Council is not an issue in this court..."

THE COMMISSIONER: I think somehow I thought it was but I am wrong I see.

MR. SOPINKA: No it wasn't. It was

mever argued that the Order in Council was unconstitutional.

The argument was --

THE COMMISSIONER: It certainly was in

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document that they gave to me, it certainly was gested but I guess it wasn't argued.

MR. SOPINKA: Well it was argued this

that the Order in Council should be so interpreted

conform with the constitutional limitations in

rovince and that is what they did. There was

ternative argument I think you are right, there

an alternative argument that if the interpretation


catended for by Mr. Lamek was correct then it was

constitutional. That may not be quite right but

is the Court of Appeal and I don't look a gift

horse in the mouth:

"It may be that it would have been vulnerable to question had the limitation not been imposed on the Commissioner that he not express any conclusion as to the civil or criminal responsibility. This inquiry should not be permitted to become that which it could have not legally been constituted to be, an inquiry to determine who was civilly or criminally responsible for the death of the child or in the circumstances of this case in lay language simply: Who killed



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the children?"

It is clear that they are limiting themselves to Phase I, who killed the children and that has nothing to do with Phase II. All the other language talks about an inquiry of the first type.

question had been civil responsibility. Everywhere in the judgement they say right there, they say civilly or criminally responsible. The province would have all the constitutional power in the world to do that, they have used civil there, and they have used it again in the passage that I read. Yet how can I determine, how can I read the judgement of the Court of Appeal otherwise if I can't deal with the civil responsibility.

MR. SOPINKA: They make it very clear in the passage that I read that they are dealing with Phase I and they are two different types of inquiry.

THE COMMISSIONER: They say civilly or criminally responsible. If they just said criminally responsible I can understand that, but they have said civilly or criminally and they go back on it on page 15.

MR. SOPINKA: Civilly responsible in a type of inquiry that is designed to determine the



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responsibility with respect to a particular act. If you look at the statement where they use, "Civilly responsible" on page 9, can you possibly suggest they are talking about Phase II.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think they Phase II was not before them.

MR. SOPINKA: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: But I have to

MR. SOPINKA: Anything they said about Phase II then that might bear on it is obiter.

THE COMMISSIONER: That may well be biter but this matter may well go back to them and then it won't be obiter.

MR. SOPINKA: That is correct. It is a well known principal that any decision has to be the circumstances that were before the court.

THE COMMISSIONER: You see the similarity,
we are dealing with exactly the same Order in Council,
are dealing with exactly the same words, that is
without the precise words I keep forgetting:

"... without expressing any conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal responsibility".





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Those were the words that they find that I cannot name names.

MR. SOPINKA: Yes, but you have to the context with respect.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

MR. SOPINKA: General words like that.

are contained in the same document, but those general

without determining criminal or civil responsibility vield different interpretations if you are dealing

constitutional impediment. So they have to be interpreted so as to keep the province within its limits. But they do not demand the same interpretation when you are dealing with an inquiry that has no constitutational limits, and the type of inquiry into the Administration of Justice which has been conducted this province on a number of occasions and in other provinces. Dilorio was in inquiry into the conduct of Quebec Police. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly approved it, and it named names. Now I have some examples here of inquiries in this province.

The inquiry by the Royal Commission on conduct of Police Forces at Fort Erie and that was conducted by Mr. John A. Pringle, and just as an

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example on page 67 in comments and recommendations

"Marijuana in its usual dry bulk form is too bulky to conceal on the body. The instructions issued to the two policewoman by Sergeant Millejours lacked judgement. He placed the two policewomen in a position of conducting searches of persons innocent of any wrong doing. At the time of such order being given and subsequently Inspector Parkhouse and Sergeant Millejours had no reasonable grounds to suspect the females were concealing heroin on their persons."

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't want you to think that I am prejudging this matter in any way, because I certainly have no idea what the conclusion is that will be reached.



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Did any of these inquiries that you refer to have these fatal words in them about criminal or civil responsibility.

MR. SOPINKA: No.

THE COMMISSIONER: You see these were stuck in by the Court of Appeal and they are taken to guide the whole process. If they are there, and if they guide the whole process it may well be that this inquiry is in fact limited more than any other inquiry.

MR. SOPINKA: Well the Order in Council may have been different, but you have to bear in mind the Attorney General in announcing this inquiry when he said that this inquiry is unprecedented he was undoubtedly referring to the first Phase Decause the second Phase was a garden variety type inquiry. So all the precautions that were imposed were with respect to the first type of inquiry.

THE COMMISSIONER: All they had to do was put that limitation, incorporate it in paragraph three, but instead of that he incorporated it in the whole Order in Council, the result is that it applies to four as well.

MR. SOPINKA: I agree that it could have been more artfully drafted. My submission is that if you

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
accept my submissions, and I am going to make an alternative submission as to how far you can go without naming names, then it should go back to the Attorney General for clarification, because it would be preposterous in my submission if we are not able to comment on the functioning of the justice system, you are not entitled to do anything. The recital says:

"Whereas concern has been expressed concerning the functioning of the justice system..."

How can you possibly allay that concern which obviously is the object of the Order in Council if you can't say you did what.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is my problem. You could not have expressed it better.

MR. SOPINKA: Ask the Attorney General, he gave you the job?





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THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

MR. SOPINKA: And of course every one of these Inquiries, the Royal Commission into Metrolitan Police Practices name names, the Grant Commission name names and it is certainly clear that that is a common type of inquiry in this Province and that was what the Attorney General intended and an my submission the existence of those inquiries are relevant to the interpretation of this Order in Juncil because they were inquiries into the functioning of the justice system, and that is what Phase II is, an inquiry into the functioning of the justice system.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. SOPINKA: Well now, if I'm wrong and the same principles apply to Phase II as applied to Phase I, as has been suggested, then I submit the situation is as follows:

In Phase I you were to determine how and by what means, et cetera, and we had an argument in the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal was obviously influenced by the fact, and then argument was made to this effect, that a very legitimate object of this Inquiry can be achieved by limiting the answer to that question to accidental or otherwise without naming names.



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Now, in Phase II you were to determine the circumstances with respect to the investigation, institution and prosecution of Susan Nelles. Without naming names the Commission can and should determine (a) whether the charges were adequately and properly investigated.

THE COMMISSIONER: And I don't even mention the names of the investigators?

MR. SOPINKA: Well, if that is the limitation, you don't mention any names.

THE COMMISSIONER: And does that mean that no evidence is ever given of a name. What do we do when we have to swear in a witness? I am not being facetious, there is a real problem about not naming names.

MR. SOPINKA: Wait a second. We had that same problem in Phase I after the Court of Appeal . Ald you couldn't name names, and I didn't hear anybody changing their mode of examination. Phyllis Trayner was here --

THE COMMISSIONER: No, no, I understand that, but part of that was we had gone so far and everybody told me I was to continue in the same method, and I gave in. Frankly, I am not at all sure that we should proceed with any evidence and allow people,



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because this has become a very, very public inquiry,

I'm sorry to say. It started off as a public inquiry,

then it became a very public inquiry and now it has

me a very, very public inquiry. Every time

somebody comes in, if I permit cross-examination of

me son saying why did you do this, why didn't you

that, why didn't you do the other thing, all of

that will be all over the papers, and I can't

say whether it was proper for him to do it or improper

for him to do it.

MR. SOPINKA: That's right.

THE COMMISSIONER: The whole thing strikes me as wildly unfair.

Phase I. The question of leading evidence that inextricably had in it the identity of the person. As
I understood it at that time when I was arguing it
in Phase I, you said, and I think quite properly, in
some cases you can't do it, you take every safeguard
to prevent it but you can't it is a choice between
a column the evidence and safeguarding identity, the
option has to be in favour of getting the evidence.
All safeguards can be made to prevent identity. But
it is not that much of a problem, everybody knows who
investigated these charges, everybody knows who





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conducted the prosecution. We are not going to be revealing anything. It is not necessary to name anybod

Now, just to answer your question. In Phase I, I take it you had the same respect for the lecision of the Court of Appeal as you have now and undoubtedly that questioning was being conducted in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

You can't say the Court of Appeal judgment governs Phase II in some aspects but not in all aspects.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I repeat what I said before. There is an object and the priect is to find out the cause of death of these children, and I can still do that and I was persuaded that the evidence went, however little to that subject, it went to it. If somebody could demonstrate clearly in Phase II even at the end - Phase I rather even at the very end, after the Court of Appeal's judgment had come out, that any of the questions that were put to Mrs. Trayner, or for that matter to any of witnesses had nothing whatever to do the more recent / :with the cause of death, only as to the identity of the person who caused the death, and then I would have ruled it out.

Now, here's the problem. If any





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question has to do not with the circumstances but as to the conduct of the people who investigated or prosecuted Susan Nelles, then is it even receivable?

MR. SOPINKA: Oh, the conduct, no. If it only goes to identity, then it shouldn't be received on this alternative argument. But obviously you investigate circumstances without investigating conduct, it's the same as it was in Phase I.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, how would I write a report? How would I write a report? Surely have to name the police who did the investigation.

| have to name - there are only two Crown Attorneys involved, I have to name them.

MR. SOPINKA: Well, call them A and B.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, it's fraudulent,
that's all.

MR. SOPINKA: You are demonstrating, in my submission, that in Phase II you can name names but if you are going to restrict yourself, I am telling you if you are going to feel constrained by that artificial limitation in Phase II, then you can report on the circumstances of the investigation. You can say, for instance, I think that the police, and this is probably what you will say, were precipitous in laying the charges after only investigating for





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and I still haven't been able to come to any conclusion as to any evidence and, therefore, I think those charges were precipitously laid. Why do you have to name any names? If you feel constrained to insignations, you can say Officer A or Officer B.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. SOPINKA: Secondly, I submit you can report on whether the charges ought to have been and, of course, I am just giving the conclusions that you can reach, that can be elaborated on extensively based on the evidence.

(c) whether the preliminary hearing properly conducted and should have continued.

And then recommendations, including inv recommendations with respect to compensation to Susan Nelles.

Now, the fact, I submit, that the Attorney General --

THE COMMISSIONER: That is a throw-away line I hope, because if I can't determine who was responsible, how can I then say that Susan Nelles should be compensated?

MR. SOPINKA: No, no. In Phase II, you determine if the charges were improperly laid, then





that may very well be a basis for recommending compensation.

THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, I see.

MR. SOPINKA: And that was obviously view of the Attorney General as to how this Nommission was to work in this phase, because on just 20, 1983, he said:

"My view is if the Royal Commission finds that Miss Nelles was treated improperly by the police or by Crown Counsel, then of course compensation would be seriously considered."

I can provide you with a copy of this statement. I have checked it with the reporter and it appeared on August 20, 1983.

Commissioner, if Phase II is to have any purpose, it must be able to go this far. If it can't go this far, then I submit that the public has really been misled when they were led to believe by the Order in Council and all the hoopla that attended its announcement that there was going to be an inquiry into the functioning of the justice system. If that is the case, I submit, with respect, that you should refer it back to the Attorney General for clarification. That would be the faster and more expedient course.

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In the alternative, if you rule that
annot do what I have submitted in my alternative
ission, then I ask that you state another case.
Itunately, as it may be, it would be equally
tunate to my client to have participated in Phase I
the expectation that Phase II was going to
I we some object in her favour and then not to have
so ahead at all for any meaningful purpose.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

. you.

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MR. HUNT: I am told there will be heckling today, so I will use this podium!

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. HUNT: Sir, as I understand your cern, it is that if you are precluded, either by the Terms of Reference or by the judgment of the Court of Appeal, or a combination of both, from menting in any report on the conduct of the parties involved in the investigation and prosecution, then is your concern that Phase II may not really be a worthwhile exercise at all, but in my submission your mandate comes from the Order in Council. The judgment of the Court of Appeal has very little to do with determining what you can do on the second phase. The Order in Council empowers you to enquire into the



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investigation and prosecution and, in my submission,

was intended to, and clearly does, empower you

not only receive the evidence as to what happened

connection with the laying of charges and prosecu
but also to comment on the conduct of the people

The only restriction imposed on you the one we are all familiar with in the Terms of making any conclusions h respect to criminal or civil responsibility. I ess the word "responsibility". All that the Court Appeal has said in connection with the argument Phase I that really touches on this question is in passage that you have pointed out at pages 14 and that it is possible, depending on the evidence, that conclusions, findings of fact you make without will either amount to conclusions of law with spect to civil responsibility or may be taken by the Mublic and others to be conclusions of law with respect to civil responsibility. That really does not go much further, in my submission, in the Terms of Reference than the proviso in the Terms of Reference.

We all know there is going to be a grey area presented to you on the evidence, both in



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Phase I and in Phase II, and you are going to have to draw the lines yourself. That is where the task mes difficult. Some have called it nearly possible or an impossible task. It is, quite clearly, ficult task to draw those lines.

To speculate at this time as to what in or cannot say in your report is difficult as because we don't know what the evidence will be.

Your mandate is to hear all the

lence, in my submission, and that is true in Phase I

THE COMMISSIONER: That is what people have been telling me. I am not at all sure that is My mandate is limited by what I can report.


Surely, if it is what I am to investigate, I can't allow the Commission to go all over the lot with all rts of allegations about things that I can't report on. That, surely, it seems to me, is fundamental.

We got around that in Phase I, and I am repeating myself now, by the fact that I have to investigate the cause of death, and I interpreted that investigation

Officerently than the way the Court of Appeal eventually interpreted it, but at least there is that excuse.

In Phase II, where is the excuse for receiving anything upon which I cannot report?

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I'm sorry.

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MR. HUNT: Aren't there really two questions here? We have blended the two. One is what are you empowered to do so far as Phase II is concerned? I say that you are obliged to hear all the evidence.

THE COMMISSIONER: What evidence?


MR. HUNT: I will address that. Saying that, I don't say there aren't going to be that are going to be objected to by parties that you are going to have to rule on.

THE COMMISSIONER: Surely, the fundaguestion will be: Why did you do that? And there will be an objection and I will have to say can't decide why he did that or whether it was a right decision or a wrong decision.

MR. HUNT: You see, this is where anto the difficulty of arguing in the abstract.

If a question is posed that the sole of which is to demonstrate civil responsibility on the part of somebody or that is the purpose --

THE COMMISSIONER: I can't think of my questions that won't be directed in cross-examination that won't be directed to that very purpose. That is, you put a policeman in the box; the first thing that



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Mr. Sopinka will do, if he is interested in his client at all, he will say, why did you charge me - as he has put it - after only two days of investigation? Why didn't you do this? Why didn't you investigate more? Why didn't you find out about the Estrella thing? Why didn't you do this, that or the other thing? Any a questions are admissible.

Are you saying they aren't?


MR. HUNT: I'm saying to you now that,

effectively to that. What I am saying to you is that there are going to be questions that have to be put if to find out what happened. That is what you are charged to do.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is right.

the most restrictive interpretation, the policeman can come in and tell what he did, whom he investigated, what stories he got and what decisions he made. The Crown Counsel can come in and say what they did. It is the cross-examination that I am going to have the much trouble, if I am not going to be able -- if I am not going to have the faintest idea of what I am going to do, why should we go ahead with this thing? That





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is the problem.

what Mr. Percival, when the time comes - but I put it to you as well, what are you going to do when the suggestion is made that the Crown Counsel - why did you do this? Why didn't you do this? Why didn't you ...? Are you going to permit those questions?

MR. HUNT: I will have to respond to

them as they are raised at the time.

THE COMMISSIONER: I would like you nd right now, please.

MR. SOPINKA: I would like to have

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Questions as to why did you do something at a particular point in time may well be primarily relevant to determining what happened, what was the explanation for what happened. The question: Why didn't you do something else? Why didn't you do this? Why didn't you do that? It may be that I will have no objection to them at the time. It may be that my objection—wait a second. That question is part of the line of questions that is solely being put to the question in order to affix that witness with civil responsibility for some wrongdoing. If that is the case, then

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there will be an objection but, surely, that is something that is part of your function in Phase II, to make those determinations when the questions arise and not say at the outset --

THE COMMISSIONER: It is beyond my ability, that is all. I don't know how I will ever do it, unless I make sort of a blanket determination that everything that reflects upon the conduct of the witness is not allowed, because, otherwise, I am going to be totally unfair to these -- if it is so that I can't report and I allow these witnesses to be crossexamined, all of these things reflected upon, then I can't, if I want to, exculpate them from this. I am not saying I want to at all. It may be quite the other way. If I want to, if they have no chance of coming out of it with anything but mud, I just don't want to go on; that is all. At least, if they have done a proper job, I want to be able to say so and I also want to be able to say if they have done a reasonable job or a half-decent job or a bad job or a hopeless job. Any of those things I want to be able to say because, otherwise, it would be unfair to the people who were -- and, you see, I don't even have to name names in the state of law.

The civil responsibility, the Chief of





of this officers; so it doesn't matter if I just
mention the police, the very fact that the police

ars of the Metropolitan Toronto Police, won't
that make him responsible? That is not your

What about the conduct of the Crown Attorneys?

Isn't that your responsibility? Isn't that the
responsibility of the Attorney General?

MR. HUNT: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: So, if I don't mention the names of the Crown Attorneys, does it make any difference? The Attorney General is responsible.

MR. HUNT: Perhaps I am not undertranslar completely your thought here, but this issue
of identifying people in Phase II is a non-issue as
far as I am concerned.


thought, instead of attacking him with it - I am a slow thinker - I am getting through to it now.

MR. HUNT: He can get back up here.

Everybody knows that Mr. McGee, Mr.

Wiley, prosecuted the case. Sergeant Press and
Sergeant Warr were investigating. No one, at least I

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am certainly not suggesting that there is any need to restrict the evidence because their identities are known or in order to keep them secret. The issue in Phase I about identity is not a parallel issue in Phase II.

THE COMMISSIONER: No. All right.

MR. HUNT: If there is a parallel

issue --

THE COMMISSIONER: The parallel issue is the divil responsibility.

MR. HUNT: And the conduct and how far you can go in commenting on the conduct.


THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. HUNT: You have already said in Phase I that you don't intend to go into the --

I understand what you are saying and I am coming around to it. In Phase I we can say whether there was a murder, as long as we don't identify the murderer.

In Phase II we can identify people as much as we like, as long as we don't say what they did.

MR. HUNT: No. I am saying to you that the parallel between Phase I and Phase II comes in at a much more specific place. It is not that you can't say what they did. Certainly, you can say what





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
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they did. It is when you come to comment on -- there is a difference between hearing the evidence and saying this is what Mr. McGee did; this is what Mr. did and then saying this is what I think about Mr. McGee did; this is what I think about what Wiley did.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can say that
the police -- this is fanciful. They had a lottery
in the police station and they decided that we will
rege X for this sort of thing. I can say that, but
I can't say I think that is an improper police pro-

MR. HUNT: I haven't said that. I

that you can listen to the evidence, you can say
this is what Mr. McGee did, this is what Mr. Wiley
did. I say that you can go so far as to say this is
what I think about what McGee did and this is what I
think about what Wiley did. Now, the question comes
at what it is you can say about your thoughts. All
that the Order in Council has said is that you cannot
express conclusions with respect to civil responsibility. The Court of Appeal has said, well, you have
got to, when you interpret that, bear in mind that
certain findings of fact, by themselves, that you make
may say something about responsibility, so that
is a fine line that you are going to have to --





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THE COMMISSIONER: Who is going to when I am sitting alone trying to write this

MR. HUNT: Mr. Lamek will probably


THE COMMISSIONER: I think he is going to take a long holiday. I don't imagine, I will ask him if he wants this task, of determining this fine line at the end of the road as to what I can do.

is going to tell us what this is all about and what should have been done, and I can't do it.

MR. HUNT: They may not be entitled to that, just like they may not be entitled to have you tell them who killed the babies, if that is what you conside that the babies were killed. The public is entitled to a full enquiry, to the evidence being analysed and reported on by you. There are lines are there are clearly lines drawn in the Order in Council that the Court of Appeal has confirmed.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. HUNT: One of the lines is it may be that they are not entitled to have you tell them what should have been done by people. They are





entitled to hear that you have received the evidence, to have you report on it, and have your comments on the conduct short of conclusions that attach civil apparaibility.

can do that? Tell me what I can say that would not
sivil responsibility? If I say they should
have done something that they didn't do, is that
not a finding of fact which without some more will
only be - I have to be careful of this, but I know
Mr. Sopinka has defended his action on negligence
as will as malicious prosecution. If that is a
cause of action is that not negligence, they should
have done something? Surely they owe a duty to
people who are charged with crimes to investigate
them thoroughly. If I decide, if I say this was not
a sufficient investigation isn't that a finding of
fact which without more may create civil responsibility.

MR. HUNT: It may be. It may be.


THE COMMISSIONER: What more can I say.

MR. HUNT: We are talking in the abstract. We are talking about really a conclusion based on a number of findings of fact that you make. I don't know what you might say about individual acts of Crown Attorneys in commenting on what they

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did at a particular time. It may not raise any concern about amounting to a statement that goes to negligence or duty owed, to a breach of duty which you say you are not going to get into. I don't know, I can't tell you.

going to get into it, and the Court of Appeal said that is exactly what you should get into in Phase I as long as I don't mention who. They say that is I can determine whether it was accidental, the act, or whether the act occurred whether it was accidental, or whether it was deliberate, that is what I am told that I must now do. So anything I said before I take back, the restrictions that I am going to put on myself, those are withdrawn because I find the restrictions are already imposed, that are now imposed are sufficient.

MR. HUNT: My portion of your comments earlier that I was referring to was your comments that you did not intend to get into what duty was owed by anybody, what breach of any duty and that sounds to me like negligence that you are talking about.

what my original position was. That was on Phase I anyway, that was my position in the Phase I. Now it has proved to be invalid.



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MR. HUNT: I say now then if you are rethinking that it may well be that you can get into -THE COMMISSIONER: Try it again and see what happens.

MR. HUNT: Well I am saying it may well be that to get into duty owed and breach of duty in such a way that your findings on those amount to, as the Court of Appeal has determined the conclusion going to civil responsibility, then you have to draw the line somewhere short of that. That does not mean that there is not a useful public exercise to be served in having the evidence of what went on with respect to the investigation and prosecution heard by you in a public forum. Having you analyse it, report on it and comment on it to the extent that you can without being in breach of the proviso in the Order in Council.

I suppose I have already said this, but in my submission really you are - if you undertake phase II you are obliged to hear all the evidence, subject to what rulings you may make during the course of it and particular questions, or lines of questions that may become apparent as we start Phase II, to you, that they are going to direct you to an area that as the area develops you determine is one that



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can bring you close to making findings which are themselves amount to a statement of civil
responsibility.

That is a question that I submit can be left to be determined when it arises. If at this point you are satisfied you are empowered by the Terms of Reference to hear the evidence and to make comments on it subject to the overriding proviso, which was put in there for the protection at the time of civil litigants, past , present and future. Mr. Jopinka says it is a garden variety type of public enquiry. It may well be, but it may be that at the outset there were suits pending against the Hospital, there were suits pending against the police, there was a suit pending against the Attorney General himself

For that reason the restriction was put in there not to just govern Phase I, but to govern Phase II. It is a unique situation not just with respect to what happened in fact but also the situation that prevailed at the time. So in my submission -

THE COMMISSIONER: We had no such trouble, I hate to refer to mylurid past, but we had no such trouble in Mississauga. No one suggested





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the fact that the Order in Council wire comments, I didn't have to make comments in that. My main concern was what happened and how do we prevent it from happening again. I made all sorts of comments in the course of that report about things that people did and what I thought with what they did. I am concerned that because of this restriction I will not be able to make the same report here. If I am not able to make that same report then why put the police and your clients too through, if I can put it, the agony of the crossexaminationSand I can't do anything about it.

Really all I want to do is have it resolved before I start in. If it develops that I think I can't do anything, the whole exercise is pretty futile. I may make a certain recommendation. If on the other hand I think I can do something I can try it out, but can't we get this thing resolved.

MR. HUNT: I hope we can. You asked me why put my clients and the police through the rigors of cross-examination.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. HUNT: Why? Because it is important that the public know what went on in the investigation and prosecution, that is one, that is the important



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aspect of this whole matter. Certainly my clients are well aware that they are going to subjected to rigorous cross-examination and they are prepared to accept that because they understand that there is an important public issue here as to what went on in the investigation and prosecution. In my submission that even stopping short of the comments you may have made in the other commission or at least you had been able to make. Why, if you can make comments, even if you may have to draw the line somewhere differently this time it is still important that it be done.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank You.

MR. SOPINKA: Mr. Commissioner, I

wonder, you raised a point that seemed to be at variance with that of the Court of Appeal placing a limitation of what you can do. Mr. Hunt was saying you don't have to determine duty and things of that nature, and you said, well that was all wrong. I have to do that. In my submission what the Court of Appeal said you can do exactly what you said you could do, determine whether the deaths were accidental or otherwise but you can't name a names.It didn't say you had to determine the legal consequences, and that





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is clear on page 18.

I don't intend to determine legal consequences. I certainly can say under the Court of Appeal's ruling that I find that there are - let us say, that there were deliberate overdoses of digoxin. I can find that there was negligent overdoses of digoxin. The Court of Appeal says that having made that finding those facts without more amount to --

MR. SOPINKA: If you name names.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, even if I don't they amounted to civil or criminal responsibility but on the part of unnamed person, that's all.

MR. SOPINKA: I don't think they said

THE COMMISSIONER: Well --

MR. SOPINKA: The thing that would have resulted in a fixing of responsibility in the Court of Appeal Judgment would have been naming names.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

MR. SOPINKA: After you determine whether it is accidental or otherwise. Here as you have said and as Mr. Hunt has said naming names is not a problem, so you can do exactly what you did in phase I, you can say whether it was accidental or





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otherwise or to use different words, whether the charges ought or ought not to have been laid, etc.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. Mr. Percival. You have an unlikely combination against you, at least I assume it is against you but the say hear what you have to say anyway.

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner, back
on April 18th, in Volume 132, pages 478 to 491, I
made rather extensive submissions to you with respect
to our position as to where the Court of Appeal decision
leaves this Commission in both Phase I and Phase II.
I don't propose to repeat those submissions in any
detail. Basically they represent our continuing
position on this rather vexing problem.

We proposed at that time that you could do a number of things to rectify the situation, none of which obviously found favour with either you or your counsel and you proceeded ahead to finish the evidence, and most of the evidence in Phase I has now been completed.

Under Phase I you were empowered to the governing clause is:

"Without expressing any conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal responsibility.





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3. To enquire into and report and make any recommendations with respect to how and by what means the children came to their death;"

And the important, the key issue in the first Phase

'me have indicated during the course of a number

of months of hearing and in response to some of the

attributions made to you by both Mr. Sopinka and Mr.

Lee key issue is "what was the cause of death?

How and by what means?", and of course that was the only overriding consideration in Phase I.

The other matter as to whether you could name names or not was a matter of collateral matter but it was not the key issue in Phase I, with respect.

The Court of Appeal at page 18 and you have read it I am sure, indicated to you that you and obliged to hear all of the evidence relating to that, and that you could not identify an individual and in t was the decision, that is the gravamen of the decision relating to the Phase I consideration.

The practical effects of that decision in the Court of Appeal surely argue that you cannot implicate any person or institution as a result of their interpretation of the Orders in Council.





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Similarly, you cannot exonerate any
or institution. Again based upon the plain
of the Court of Appeal decision that relates
to the whole Order in Council.

What you have been required to do, you have to look at it, it seems to me, because the line without expressing any conclusion of law line civil or criminal responsibility holds true line pect to both paragraph 3 and paragraph 4. I line order for you to determine what your power and authority is in Phase II you must look at the terms of Order in Council and regard them. The change in terminology is rather interesting and I say to you it is important.

If you look at the authority under

conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal
responsibility, you were to enquire into and report
as make any recommendations with respect to
how and by what means.

Now you note how it changes the terminology when you get into paragraph 4:

"To enquire into, determine and report on the circumstances surrounding the investigation, institution, and





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prosecution of charges arising out of the deaths of the above mentioned four infants;"

You will note I am satisfied, Mr.

Commissioner, and I am sure you all ready have that
word "determine" has been inserted in paragraph 4
where it was not in paragraph 3. The words "and
make any recommendations" have not been carried
forward into paragraph 4 and in fact have been
deleted if one uses the same terminology.





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I say to you you must consider for the purposes of your deliberations as to where you're going in Phase II as to first of all what significant if any is the deletion of the words, "make recommenda tions", and the insertion of the word, "determine", in paragraph 4.

The word, "determine", according to the Oxford dictionary, says the word "determine" means to find out or calculate precisely, to settle or decide and, thirdly, to come to a conclusion or give

Obviously I say in relation to Phase II and the interpretation of Paragraph 4 you are required to make inquiries and hear evidence and find out what investigation was performed by the police and what was done by the Crown and the Prosecution of the charges.

However, I point out to you, Mr.

Commission, you are not asked to make any recommendations as to how the investigation should have been done or how the prosecution should have been conducted. You have no authority to do so, at least in relation to the plain wording of Paragraph 4.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, recommmendations surely are for the future, are they not?



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24 25 MR. PERCIVAL: Well, recommendations relating to how and by what means, if you are going to talk about recommendations, that's what Paragraph aays, are you going to be talking in terms of ommendations as to how and by what means?

THE COMMISSIONER: No, but make any ecommendations with respect to how and by what means children who died, perhaps what it means there will make recommendations so that the same thing the li not happen again, although, I would have thought hat was already been done in the Dubin Report.


MR. PERCIVAL: I would have thought so, would have thought so.

THE COMMISSIONER: Surely if we didn't have this limitation without expressing any conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal responsibility we would have had no trouble with this.paragraph.

MR. PERCIVAL: That's right.

THE COMMISSIONER: That inquire into, determine the report on the circumstances would be enough not only to report on them but to say what I think of them.

MR. PERCIVAL: Well, with respect, I don't think you are authorized to do that, with respect.



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now, perhaps not now. All I'm saying, if we just

any difficulty with it - you might but I wouldn't

have any difficulty with it. I would think I was

supposed to look into what happened and say what I

think of it.

MR. PERCIVAL: What I am saying to you,

commissioner, the limitation imposed upon you

terms of the Order in Council are two fold:

Low you are only authorized to make inquiries as to

was done and not what should have been done and

the are not authorized to make any recommendations

in relation to Phase II. You must inquire and hear

coidence that will support conclusions that cannot

are expressive of either civil or criminal responsibility.

The consideration of civil responsibility is of no consequence to the clients that I represent.

They are facing a law suit at the present time for damages for \$854,000 plus prejudgment interest in action commenced by Susan Nelles for both negligence and malicious prosecution and, for the record, and I propose to now file with you both a copy of

Now, you know, this question, and I





at, please?

will be fine.

the Statement of Claim and a copy of Statement of
Defense because you must look at that before you
determine where we are going on the issue of civil
Liability.

May I ask that these be marked as exhibits. It is a Statement of Claim and a Statement of Claim and a Statement of the clients that I regresent.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right.

MR. PERCIVAL: Copies are being

distributed to other counsel by Mr. Young at the

present time.

THE COMMISSIONER: What number are

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner, I ask you to note that this statement --

THE COMMISSIONER: Can we put them in as one exhibit?

MR. PERCIVAL: That will be fine, that

THE REGISTRAR: 412.

THE COMMISSIONER: 412 is the number.



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A Statement of Claim and a EXHIBIT NO. 412: Statement of Defense submitted by Mr. Percival's clients.

MR. PERCIVAL: Now, I ask you to note,

assionerthat this Statement of Claim is as a result of a Supreme Court action and the Writ was issued on November 5th, 1982, the Statement m was delivered on January 26th, 1983 and both of which were in existence before the Order in was prepared which gives you your authority

Now, the Statement of Claim is very

that they claim both negligence and malicious intent on the part of the officers in relation to They did involving their investigation and the laying of charges against Susan Nelles. The gations of negligence are there in some considerable detail and that is the law suit that my clients figing at the present time. Pleadings have been leted, no Examinations for Discovery have been nced, a successful application has been made by Mr. Hunt's clients to strike out the plaintiff's cause of action against the Crown Attorneys as disclosing no known cause of action.

Mr. Sopinka, I think has told you on an earlier occasion that that decision is presently under appeal.



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So, that is where that action is at the present time.

I submit to you that given the delineation of the issues Mr. Sopinka has the right in that action to ask all the questions of the police officers involved in the investigation with a view to attempting to show either that (a) they acted negligently in the course of their investigation or (b) that they acted deliberately with malice.

However, I suggest to you that in this Commission and, in Phase II that such a right does not exist for Mr. Sopinka or any other counsel to question the police or any other witness in Phase II as to why they didn't do this or that and why they did act in a certain manner because such evidence if permitted could only be relevant to the issue whether the police were guilty of malfeasance, nonfeasance or influenced by malice or an attempt to injure Susan Nelles.

If the evidence has to go to that then the wrong forum and you are not authorized, with respect, given the limitation imposed upon you by the Orders in Council.

The questions, the cross-examination questions as to why you did this and why you did that





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
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
Phase II. It can't be. It is not the overriding about how and by what means the cause of death, there is no other issue in Phase II that could be directed

It is my submissions you are only authorized to make inquiries into what the police lid in the course of their investigation and report on that investigation.

I submit you are not authorized to hear evidence of a nature that may tend to show that the police or the Crown Attorneys did something wrong or failed to do something in the course of their investigation or prosecution.

Now, in Phase II you have, just as you did in Phase I, competing considerations, with respect. The police force want to tell the public what they did in the course of their investigation. The public is entitled to know what was done with their tax paid dollars to try to put an end to this epidemic of baby deaths and the end did occur with the arrest of Susan Nelles. But on the other hand the police officers -- In effect, the citizens of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto are in effect the defendants in this civil law suit commenced





by Susan Nelles.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. I would have the competing obligations if it weren't for the decision of the Court of Appeal.

MR. SOPINKA: I under stand that,
Mr. Commissioner, but, you know, you have indicated
that you are going to live with it and I guess if
it holds true to Phase I it holds true to Phase II
and that's the unfortunate dilemma with which you
are being faced with at the present time and it is
a continuing, vexing problem.

If you made an adverse finding or canclucion or decided a matter of fact with respect to a police officer, a coroner or a Crown Attorney, that Idverse finding would be tantamount I submit to a finding that would reflect on the potential civil liability of that individual.





Now, it is true, without question,

that sort of thing, that evidence that they give cannot be utilized, your findings could not be utilized in a subsequent civil action, but just as it is true, just as it is true with respect to a criminal action was put by Mr. Sopinka too often in this the Divisional Court, in the Court of Appeal about how could they get a fair trial. We are facing

Toronto. If you are going to make findings, hear such evidence, permit such cross-examination, how is that to be a fair trial in due course? Surely the civil rights of the nurses are no different, are no more than that of the police officers.

That of course is the issue that you have - Adress in relation to making your decision in this matter. I want you to refer if you would to the fact that Mr. Sopinka keeps saying that, oh, no, that only deals with Phase I. Look at page 17 in the Court of Appeal decision with me, if I may point this out to you, and at the middle of the first paragraph:

"In our opinion the specific limitation



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imposed on the Commission by the Order in Council in the circumstances was imposed out of concern for those persons who might become involved in other proceedings or be called upon to stand their trial."

Now, whether that is criminal or whether that is civil, clearly that has to do with both of them. It is a limitation of civil or criminal responsibility. So, whether or not it is a potential charge of murder or a potential charge of gross negligence or relating to the deaths of the babies, surely it goes as well to this potential civil responsibility of the Police Chief acting as the titular head of all the members of the police force and the police officers in question.

If the nurses would be deprived of a fair trial if you do certain things how is it any different for the police in relation to this action with which we are faced? It is no different I submit . What holds true for one surely should hold true for the other.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I think we can go a little farther because there is always the possibility might exonerate the police completely.



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MR. SOPINKA: But you can't. You can't with respect.

THE COMMISSIONER: No.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ PERCIVAL: And that's what I said eack in April 18th.

THE COMMISSIONER: How does Susan Telles get a fair trial?

MR. PERCIVAL: That's right. I mean, that's the unfortunate dilemma you are being faced with by the Court of Appeal decision. You can't implicate and you can't exonerate, with respect.

Now, I am going to answer the question that you put to Mr. Hunt and said that you were going to put to me because I fully intended to put it, to tell you, and this is where Mr. Hunt and I part company. I am not going to wait until it happens.

May I tell you that if you decide to proceed with a full scale Phase II and you decide that you are authorized to proceed fully with respect to an inquiry into Phase II and permit the cross-examination that I say you are not authorized to do, then on the first question that is put to any client that I represent that tends to show why they did this and why didn't they do that, I will object, I will ask you to state a case and we will go merrily on to the Divisional





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Court and the Court of Appeal. This time I will be arguing the reverse of what I argued before. Mr.

Stounka will have the priviledge of doing the reverse as well.

MR. SOPINKA: And probably with the same results.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm not to sure what that means!

MR. PERCIVAL: So, Mr. Commissioner,

I would submit on behalf of my clients that you should hear the evidence in Phase II. I say that you are authorized to hear such evidence but only on a limited basis, to which I have alluded. In other words, hear what the Police did, hear what the Crown Attorneys did, report on that, but when we get to the point of whether they should not or should have then we part company, with respect.

Those are my submissions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right, thank you. Mr. Scott?

MR. SCOTT: Mr. Commissioner, there is not much more to be said at this stage that would be of use to you but as Mr. Sopinka points out that has never been a problem - for him.

MR. SOPINKA: For you.

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MR. SCOTT: Let me begin by saying that unlike the others I don't intend to tell you that if you don't do what I want I will ask for a stated case and go to the Court of Appeal. The posture of the Hospital throughout has been to co-operate with this inquiry, to support any findings you make as to your powers under the Act and to assist you in a general way in bringing the task to a reasonable expeditious conclusion in as fair a way as can be ione.

But when you approach this problem I think there are a couple of observations that might usefully be made. The first has to do with Mr. Sopinka's reading of the Decision of the Court of Appeal.

In the first place the Court of Appeal decision is, and I think you are right about this, is explicit that you are obliged if you can on the evidence to find murder.





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It said you couldn't name names but if

You should conclude on the evidence that there was a

murder at the Hospital, you must say so, and that is

clear at page 15, where the Court was responding

the argument we were making that you could name

if you left out of your findings elements that

to do with the state of mind or intent of the

sion of Mr. Justice Reid, which said that that

mise would permit both the interests of Mr.

inka's client and the interests of the Inquiry to


exist. There, the Court of Appeal said, in the

fact of that:

"He (meaning you) has no discretion that would permit him to decline to make a finding of intent or state of mind relative to the cause of death in order to make a finding identifying the person responsible because, in his view of the interests, it would be better to do so."

So, really, the Court of Appeal has not only said that you may make in Phase I all the findings with respect to the elements of murder except the name, they go further and say you have no discretion





to refuse to do that if, of course, the evidence warrants those findings.

That is the first point. That point, if course, I will be telling you, is as relevant to Phase II as it is to Phase I.

The second point to be observed is that there is no constitutional impediment or issue in this proceeding at the present time, notwithstanding Mr. Sopinka's efforts. The Court of Appeal, in the paragraph to which he has referred and which I will not read again, made it perfectly plain that if the language "no civil or criminal findings" had not been included, there might have been a constitutional issue, but there wasn't that problem because the language was there, and what they did explicitly was interpret the impact of that language. Their interpretation, as you have noted, sir, must apply to Phase I as well as to Phase II because the Order in Council doesn't make any distinction about the application of that language as between the two phases, and none can be drawn if the Order in Council doesn't permit it.

Now, a couple of other observations.

I take it that it be obvious that if you can't name names

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in Phase II. There is simply no basis for distinguishing between the two phases.

You see, the thing is, really, the prohibition is against determining civil responsibility. It does say to me that one can name names if there is some way you can avoid — the problem is, is there any way, after naming names, that I can avoid. In Phase II, it seems to me, we either have to name names and whether we do or not, it doesn't matter. The obvious — the liable defendant is there. But if there were some way that we could name the names or not name the names but at least set forth some kind of useful information without — by giving that information without in the same breath giving an opinion on civil responsibility, whether it is stated or not —

MR. SCOTT: One hopes that that could be done, but the problem is that the Court of Appeal foreclosed Mr. Justice Reid's determination, which was precisely that. The problem put to the Court was that if you make all these factual findings, including the naming of names, you are making a finding which is tantamount to a criminal liability finding; so what was proposed, which the Court of Appeal ultimately



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adopted, is remove the ultimate finding; that is, the name of the actor, from the mix and you go ahead and do everything else.

As the Court of Appeal said, in the passage I have just read, you must go ahead and do everything else. You cannot avoid looking at intent if the evidence warrants it.

So that was the justification for the rationale that the Court of Appeal adopted.

Now, applying that to Phase II, it would be useful to say, well, we will name names in Phase II. We simply won't make one of the other -- we won't find one of the other elements - we won't find negligence. But the Court of Appeal, in that passage that I have read, says that you can't do that.

Now, it may be that they didn't intend to say that. It may be properly instructed once again by Mr. Sopinka that they would say something else, but the fact is that that is what they have said. Therefore, in my respectful submission, you will have to exercise your well-known ingenuity to permit the naming of names in Phase II if it is not to be permitted in Phase I.

Now, when you come to the naming of names, the next question is, what are we talking about

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in terms of names? I take it to be obvious, and all counsel no doubt would agree on this, that when we are talking about names, we are not only talking about names of individuals, we are talking about names of institutions that have them, like the tropolitan Toronto Police Department and the Crown Attorney's Office. You can name the Hospital; we don't care about that.

MR. SOPINKA: Obviously, that must be included or my friend wouldn't be taking his position.

MR. SCOTT: No, not at all. I have said initially that we are quite prepared to support you in whatever you want to do on this subject, but I think it is significant to recognize that when you get into Phase II, if unempeded by the Court of Appeal decision, there are going to be some interesting propositions put to you. As the Attorney General and the Police flay back and forth in the evidence, it may be that they are going to say that other people — that they wouldn't have done what they did unless other people, nurses, for example, had done thus and so. We have already, in Phase I, heard suggestions that the police were, in some sense, handicapped because the nurses had a meeting within a day or two of the





criminal events.

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Now, if that comes up in Phase II, the question will be put to the witness: Well now, witness, wasn't that meeting you and your fellow nurses had designed to impede the police investigation? If that question were put, the damage is done when the question is asked and you can't make a finding in the Inquiry that determines that that inuendo is unwarranted because, to do so --

THE COMMISSIONER: Would that involve the nurses in any responsibility? Because, surely, the nurses don't have to -- they don't have to cooperate with the police if they don't want to.

MR. SCOTT: I understand that entirely, but you are going to have to deal with that. This is an imaginery scenario for the moment but let's assume that the police, that criticism is made of the police, as Mr. Sopinka has already made it, for laying the charges within two days and supposing the police were to say, well, the reason we did that was because the nurses were freezing us out, having meetings, and we had to do something. That is their explanation for the alleged misconduct. You have to find if that is justified or not and, in the course of that, you will have to make comments about the





Attorney General but also perhaps of the nurses, and that may expose them, to -- It may, I don't say it necessarily will.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think it would but I might be wrong. I suppose it is arguable.

MR. SCOTT: It may. I put it no higher than that; it may.

The other interesting feature about the task before you is that when we were in Phase I or when we were dealing with Phase I --

THE COMMISSIONER: As we were yesterday and we will be tomorrow, yes.

MR. SCOTT: -- there was an area of enquiry and finding about which nobody doubted your powers under the Order in Council - how and by what means the babies died. Therefore, what we were talking about when we applied the Order in Council to Phase I and applied the Court of Appeal decision to Phase I was the fringes. Everyone admitted that the heart of the Phase I work still had to be done to determine the medical causes or the non-medical causes of these babies' deaths.

Now, the issue for you is applying the

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no-naming of names principle to Phase II: Is there any enquiry heart left in Phase II that can be dealt with in any significant way without the naming of names?

Now, on the one hand it can be said, and has been said, that it is useful to have the witnesses in the witness box so that the public can hear what they say, and I am very sympathetic to that general proposition. On the other hand, it can and has been said that the whole thing is an extravagance at public expense. If you are impeded from making any determination in a practical sense in light of the Court of Appeal decision, one of the difficulties, it seems to me, is how could you make any comment? You might want to, but how could you make any comment on the conduct of these actors — the police, the police officers, the Attorney General, the Crown Attorneys — without exposing them potentially to civil or criminal liability?

If, for example, Mr. Sopinka at the end asked you -- examined a police officer - why didn't you conduct a longer investigation? Only two days? He gives his reasons why he acted and what he did and Mr. Sopinka comes along at the end of the Inquiry and asks you to find that they moved too





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
quickly. Well, that is a finding that goes directly to civil liability.

Now, if you can't do any of those things, and it is for you to say whether the Court of Appeal precludes that, you can blame it on the Court of Appeal and you can say whether the Court of Appeal precludes that. It is hard to see any area in which you can pursue your evidence that will produce a useful result and, while there is much to be said for hearing the evidence, almost without cross-examination because very little would be permitted under these ground rules - there is a lot to be said for hearing it because the public has a certain right to know what went on.

It seems to me what you have to weigh is whether the public interest requires the extravagant expense that this will necessitate in a circumstnace where the Court of Appeal has deprived you, or the Order in Council has deprived you, of the right to make an effective finding.

I don't think I can assist you any further.

question. You don't need to answer it at all. What about the suggestion of going back to the source and





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asking for clarification before we make any final determination?


MR. SCOTT: Which source? The Attorney General or the Court of Appeal?

THE COMMISSIONER: No. The source I am talking about is the Lieutenant Governor in Council, who issued this Order in the first place.

MR. SCOTT: I would have thought, with the greatest of respect, sir, the first stage is for you to decide what you think your powers are.

THE COMMISSIONER: I did decide that once, and you know what happened to me. I had some firm ideas in that instance. I really have none in this.

MR. SCOTT: With the greatest of respect, I would be uncomfortable if anybody thought that I was defending Mr. Hunt's client at this point, let alone the Attorney General. Surely, it would be unfair to the Attorney General to sort of go back to him and say that I have this problem, will you look at the Order in Council. It seems to me that what is required for you is to decide the issue and then, when it is decided, if the Attorney General —he won't be unaware of your decision and, if he acts, he acts. If someone wants to go to the Court of Appeal then, they can go to the Court of Appeal again.





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THE COMMISSIONER: That is a horrifying thought, because, what do we do in the meantime. I really don't want to start until we get this settled.

MR. SCOTT: No.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't want to go through what we went through the last time.

MR. SCOTT: I think, if I may respectfully say so, I think that is entirely sound, but if you make your decision and if your decision is to barrel ahead and carry on, well then you carry on unless someone then - unless the Attorney General intervenes or unless somebody ask so for a stated case.

If your decision is that you can't carry on in the circumstances, then those who think you should can apply for a stated case. I have no doubt that we can get it dealt with expeditiously

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but not until the Fall. They were very cooperative the last time, and I am sure they will be cooperative again, but there is no possibility of this thing being decided until the Fall. What do I do in the meantime, I suppose I write Phase I. It keeps me occupied and out of trouble.

MR. SCOTT: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: But we don't continue





with Phase II.

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MR. SCOTT: I would have thought that it would be heard, I suppose Counsel will have to analyse whether we have to go through the Divisional Court.

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THE COMMISSIONER: What I am concerned with is this. If, shouldn't the Attorney General be asked what he intended, or what the Lieutenant Governor in Council intended, and if they intended something different from what it appears the Court of Appeal has ruled as far as Phase II is concerned, let him give some thought to correcting it because that can be done in an afternoon.

MR. SCOTT: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Whereas this other procedure will take all of this time and I will not - I promise you I will not do anything until it is resolved.

MR. SCOTT: Well I have no objection to asking the Attorney General. My only concern is whether it should be - whether it is fair to ask him or the Lieutenant Governor before you have enunciated what the problem is.

THE COMMISSIONER: Certainly I am going to enunciate what the problem is. You think



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I have to make a decision one way or the other.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ SCOTT: Well there is no problem until you decide what the $^{T}\!\operatorname{erms}$ of $^{R}\!\operatorname{eference}$ mean.

THE COMMISSIONER: There is a problem and the problem is going to come in the first question in cross-examination of the police officer.

MR. SCOTT: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And I know what the problem is and I want to face it now and get it resolved.

MR. SOPINKA: Give him a transcript of his argument and he will know what the problem is.

asking him and that may be the appropriate course.

My only concern is that perhaps he might very well
say, well look, what is your ruling. If you make
a ruling I will then be guided by the policy considerations
as to do we amend your Order in Council
or not, but absent a ruling I have nothing to
reconsider. So it may just get bounced back. If you
want to try by asking him I see no harm in it, and I
am sure Mr. Hunt can carry the message. It would,
there is no doubt it would be the expeditious
resolution of the difficulty.



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to have happen, I don't want to come to that moment that Mr. Percival has promised, I don't want to make all these arrangements and sign the lease and all the rest of it and then find that all of a sudden the whole

THE COMMISSIONER: What I don't want

we really should - there are times when we really

thing folds. That is what I want to avoid.

have to --

MR. SCOTT: You see, sir, with the greatest of respect without a ruling, if you make a request of the Attorney General, and I don't know whether you can do this, but he might just hold a press conference or make a statement in the Legislature telling the Legislature what was intended. Well. we all ready have one of those which has been used by both sides.

THE COMMISSIONER: It would have to be amended to make it clear. Notwithstanding what he may say, what he intends, but that doesn't stop Mr. Percival from applying for a stated case.

MR. SCOTT: No.

THE COMMISSIONER: And I have no doubt that he will proceed so he has got to make an amendment, and if he doesn't make an amendment it is useless.



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MR. SCOTT: Well that is one course that you can follow, it certainly has the virtue of expedition. I can ask you to consider whether you want to make that request in the light of, in advance of telling them what you think you would be obliged to rule.

THE COMMISSIONER: Supposing I didn't say what I thought I was obliged to rule and say to the Attorney General, is this what you had in mind.

Is it, will you please take the appropriate steps.

MR. SCOTT: And that way you would be telling him in advance what your ruling would be.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I would tell him I could make the ruling but then before anybody had a chance to ask me for a stated case he could, if he wanted to, if he wanted to, if he doesn't want to he doesn't have to, he could amend the Order in Council.

MR. SCOTT: Yes. And there would be a certain justice in making that request of him, I understand that. I am obliged to you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

Thank you. I think we will take a few minutes now and then I will hear from anybody else who wants to be heard from, including Mr. Lamek and there will be



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an opportunity for reply. I guess I should offer that opportunity to Mr. Sopinka and Mr. Hunt.

MR. SOPINKA: It will be quite short.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Okay. All right.

We will take 20 minutes.

--- (Short recess)

--- (Upon resuming)

MR. SCOTT: Mr. Commissioner, there is one point that I might have added to.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. SCOTT: And I am grateful to one of my friends for pointing it out. If there is any doubt that the phrase "without finding any criminal or civil liability" applies to the Phase II issue as well as Phase I, if there is any doubt about that and I think Mr. Sopinka doubts it; if you look at the Attorney General's statement in the Legislature when he explained why he was using that phrase. I don't have it right at hand but it is engrained in my memory. He speaks not only of the criminal proceedings that might flow, but also of the civil actions to which Mr. Percival has made reference.

So it was for that dual purposes that the phrase was obviously inserted in theorder in Council. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.





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Thank you. I think before we go on I should say something about what our intentions are. There are probably, I am now informed, no more witnesses that the Commission intends to call in Phase I. I would like at some point, probably after we complete Dr. Bunt tomorrow to discuss all applications that anyone has to require the Commission to call certain witnesses. I also want to hear from all Counsel as to what witnesses they intend to call. I have some control over that because of course it must be only under the Act, it must be only to call and examine witnesses relevant to his interest. So you will have to prove when you are calling a witness, that it is relevant to your interest.

The reason I would like to get that done as soon as possible is that as soon as that is done we can then schedule argument. I think I would like to be able to schedule it, if we know what witnesses, if any, are still to be called, we know roughly how long they are going to take. I can set a date for argument on Phase I, and the sooner I set that the happier everybody is going to be.

Now I still intend, unless everybody tells me it is a futile exercise, to discuss the question of - I don't think I will make the ruling but





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I would like to know who is applying for a stated case in Phase II, and I think we will deal with that question after we have completed this one and that may of course, be this afternoon.

Now, I'm sorry, I keep forgetting you Miss Rae. Do you have any comments to make on this problem?

MS. RAE: No, I have not Mr. Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Miss Chown.

MS. CHOWN: Yes. Thank you Mr. Commissioner.

My comments will be brief because I think the four speakers who have preceded me have canvassed the issue rather thoroughly and I do not see that there is any

point in repeating it. What they have said has outlined to you rather clearly the diversification of opinion that you have in this forum before you as to what the correct approach to Phase II would be.

In my view the difficulty can be summarized as to how we apply the Court of Appeal ruling to the mandate in the Order in Council to investigate the circumstances surrounding the investigation and prosecution of Susan Nelles.

What the speakers before me have attempted to do is to say whether that part of the Order in Council can be successfully divided into





two parts. That is the examination of the circumstances of what happened in the police investigation and the prosecution. Secondly, as to any comments you may have as Mr. Hunt phrased it, on your view of the actions.

Thirdly, that whether you think they should have done something different.

Mr. Hunt's position has certainly been that you should be able to state what these individuals did, that is the police, the Crown Attorneys and Coroners; and further that you should be able to go and say what you think about it.

THE COMMISSIONER: I wasn't sure it
was as clear as that. I am glad it was clear to you.

MS. CHOWN: I took these very clear
notes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Fine. All right.

MS. CHOWN: I am fairly simplifying
his views. Mr. Percival's views as I took it was
that you were not permitted to go on to offer any
comment because that strayed into the area of civil
and criminal responsibility.

THE COMMISSIONER: He made that very clear.

MS. CHOWN: It is my view that Mr.



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Percival's view of the evidence is the appropriate one, and I am simply offering the practical observation that we are then left with a situation in which if Phase II is to really be a recitation of the facts that happened, we are left with you reporting on the chronology of events, and in fact if that is all you are able to do that wou ld be something that could be done by filing of a statement of prima facie facts as was done with respect to Phase I, or a simple recitation of who did what on what occasion.

But to stray into such questions as to why those activities were done, Mr. Percival has already alerted you that he will take immediate exception to that as straying into forbidden territory of approaching or encroaching upon a conclusions of civil or criminal responsibility.

The other approach is to have the individuals called to give live evidence, but to do so only in chief and not in cross-examination, because in my view that would get us into difficulties. I don't think that is a very satisfactory state of events. Public perception has been raised by several Counsel and I think the public is not going to find it satisfactory if we begin on this exercise and are immediately faced with going and rushing to



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making representations to the Divisional Court on a stated case. That will be the subject of numerous editorials as to the continuing length of time this Commission is taking.

My final point is simply, I do not know of what assistance it would be to all of us to simply have a chronology of events given by live witnesses. It may be that this problem as you have suggested could be resolved, and I think it should be resolved before embarking on Phase II by an approach to the Lieutenant Governor in Council to clarify the bounds of what was intended in the Terms of Reference. Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you Miss Chown. Miss McIntyre.

MS. McINTYRE: Thank you, sir, I will try to be brief. I would like to state first that I support Mr. Sopinka's position that really the Court of Appeal decision has very little bearing on Phase II, that is it is a very different type of enquiry and the reasoning of course does not necessarily apply.



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However, in the alternative, I would take the position that if the Court of Appeal Decision does apply, it should be applied consistently to Phase II as it was done in Phase I, otherwise, the perception will be that the Commission is somehow being less than even handed in the application of the court decision.

I would like to refer --

THE COMMISSIONER: You understand what the problem is.We didn't have the Court of Appeal Decision until the other day. I can well see what the opinion, what the appearance will be and I can well see what the letters will be but I want you to understand the difference and it is a very great difference. We didn't have the Court of Appeal Decision. Now we do have it and there is the difference that Mr. Scott pointed out and others pointed out, that there is no corollary issue involved here that we can justify the questions that went on in Phase I. There is no other issue.

The only issue we have here is to inquire into and report upon the investigation and the prosecution. If in the course of doing that -- I just want you to understand that. I don't expect that everybody is going to understand this and I don't



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expect that people won't understand that but you at least, you at least can understand what the distinction is and recognize it and appreciate it and even conceivably speak to your clients about it.

So, I understand what will happen and we are faced with this in this Commission all the time. But I would like a little help from you on this issue. If I do have to reach the conclusion that there is a difference I want you to understand it and I think it would be nice if you told your clients something about it too.

MS. McINTYRE: : Certainly, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. McINTYRE: We will try to explain your position.

THE COMMISSIONER: Unexplainable as it is you will try to explain it, that's all. But you are a lawyer, you can understand what I am faced with.

MR. McINTRYRE: Yes, yes. It is a very difficult problem, sir and I appreciate that. In fact, I would support going back for further clarification and assistance on how the matter of Phase II should proceed. I think that makes a lot of sense because I think this is a very difficult problem that we are confronted with.



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The point I was going to make sir, is that I think the Court of Appeal has the direction given by the Court of Appeal on page 18 of the decision, makes it clear that you are obliged to hear all the evidence --

THE COMMISSIONER: Relating to the cause of death of the children.

MR. McINTYRE: -- relating to the cause of death of the children, right.

THE COMMISSIONER: Because that is what I am instructed to do.

MR. McINTRYE: And if that same prinicple is applied to Phase II where the core issue is not the cause of death but the circumstances surrounding the investigation and prosecution, then the application of that direction would again be to hear all of the evidence.

THE COMMISSIONER: Even though I can't make any comment upon it at all even though I can't say whether what they did was good or bad?

MR. McINTRYE: Well, I will get to that any moment, sir. But I think first there is nothing in the Court of Appeal Decision that would restrict you from hearing evidence and in fact it goes the other way.



THE COMMISSIONER: Remember, please appreciate that there is another issue in Phase I.

There is only one issue in Phase II and should I hear any evidence that I can't report on, should I hear any evidence about the price of eggs in Peru or something, when it's none of my business, when I'm not allowed to comment about whether the price is high or low, how can I hear evidence. This is the issue.

Now, I am not determining the matter but I want you to understand that I can't do what I think is right, I have to do according to the law. If I could do, every time in my life what I think is right, we would have what is called anarchy. Therefore, we have a law and laws are to be followed by everybody and I have stated in the Judgement it is more important for it to be followed by judges than by anybody else. If I start deciding that I can do anything that I want to do then justice has come to a pretty pass. I have to follow the law.

I want you to help me in telling me about what the law is. Do you understand? I don't want you to tell me what you think I should do because I know what I think I should do, I have no trouble with that, with that issue.





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MR. McINTYRE: I'm trying to do that,

sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right,

thank you.

MR. McINTYRE : Perhaps I am failing miserably but I am trying.

THE COMMISSIONER: No.


MR. McINTYRE: It seems to me that you are governed by the Order in Council as it may be affected by the decision of the Court of Appeal.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. McINTYRE: And if I could deal with Mr. Percival's suggestion that the police should be called to give their side of the story and to give a recital of facts from their point of view and not be subject to cross-examination as to why they did or didn't take particular actions, I can't think that that can be the intent of the Attorney General or whoever drafted the Order in Council that that would be a useless exercise.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I am not far away from you on that.

MR. McINTYRE: So, that cannot be the correct position. It seems to me that what you can do is, you can hear all the evidence and there is,



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even if you cannot comment on the propriety of conduct, there is a purpose to be served in hearing all the evidence and the public has the right to know the facts surrounding the investigation and prosecution.

As far as your findings are concerned it would be my position that you can comment on the investigation. If there is a limitation, that is where the limitation is imposed. You cannot go to the extent of making findings that specifically support a conclusion of negligence.

THE COMMISSIONER: Can you tell me
a finding that I could make that wouldn't support
a finding of negligence or non-negligence, can you
tell me any finding that I could make that would
be of any value? I suppose I can say that Policeman
X interviewed nurse Y on such and such a date and
she said Z. I can say that?

MR. McINTYRE: Yes, you can certainly to that far.

THE COMMISSIONER: And how much help is that. And then I can say nurse Y said it was quite different from what Policeman X said. Now, then I really can't say, I almost can't say I believe Nurse Y or I believe Policeman X on this question





because to do so would indicate, would be a finding or might be a finding of fact which would assist the finding of negligence or non-negligence on the part of the police.

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do it.

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MR. McINTYRE: Well, it would be my position, sir, that you can make such a finding, you just can't name names when you make such findings.

That's what the Court of Appeal has stated at page

really it. They say that the combination of the finding of fact plus the names creates the criminal responsibility. But in Phase II how can you prevent naming names because the names are there, they are the names of the policemen who have done this or have done that or the other thing or the names of the Crown Attorneys. As I have said this so often there are two Crown Attorneys. I don't know how many policemen there are but there are only two Crown Attorneys involved in this matter. I just don't understand how I can

MR. McINTYRE: Well, sir, there were a limited number of nurses in Phase I as well. But I would take the position contrary to what some of my friends have said that you can make findings that



exonerate individuals and you can name names.

THE COMMISSIONER: I can make findings that exonerate people?

MR. McINTYRE: Yes you can, sir, in my submissions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Are we talking about what, Phase I or Phase II?

MR. McINTYRE: Phase II.

THE COMMISSIONER: Exonerate individuals?


MR. McINTYRE: Yes. Page 15 of the

Decison of the Court of Appeal only limits you in naming names with respect to those facts which constitute a conclusion of criminal or civil responsibility.

THE COMMISSIONER: Supposing I exonerate the police, doesn't . that affect the Nelles action somehow. If I said the police did everything properly, doesn't that affect the Nelles action?

MR. McINTYRE: Well, I would take the position that you can make findings that exonerate, you just cannot make findings that would lead to the conclusion of liability.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, to a conclusion of non-liability, isn't that the same thing? I don't understand this, I just don't understand it. If I were



to say that the police did everything properly, the Crown Attorneys did everything properly, that's exonerating them all. Doesn't that have some effect on the Nelles action? I mean, isn't that the same finding as what they want.

MR. McINTYRE: Well, the affect on the Nelles action is another issue, sir, but I would take the position that all this prevents you from doing is naming names where it results in a finding of liability or responsibility.

THE COMMISSIONER: So, all it prevents me from doing is naming names and you say that what I can do is what, what can I do?

MR. McINTYRE: Is that you can hear all the evidence, including questioning as to why actions were not taken by the police and that you can comment on the evidence except that you cannot name names.

I do that, please tell me how I do that? This is what this is for is for help. Now, tell me how I can do that. How will I do that. Now, for instance, I simply say, do I name the name in the report at all?

MR. McINTYRE: Yes, you can name the names when you are reciting the facts.



task.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, recite all the facts, including the fact?

MR. McINTYRE: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And what do I say,

I can comment on it?

MR. McINTYRE: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And say I believe one side and say I believe the other, I think they did it properly or I think they did it improperly, I can say all of that?

MR. McINTYRE: Well, sir, it is difficult. I can see that it is a very difficult task.

THE COMMISSIONER: It's an impossible

MR. McINTYRE: Well, it may well be and, therefore, I support the suggestion of going back for further direction and clarification.


THE COMMISSIONER: Supposing I don't get it, what then?

MR. McINTYRE: Then, sir, you will have to going to make a decision.

THE COMMISSIONER: Then I have a problem.

Do you think I should go back for further direction

before I make a decision, do you?





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MR. McINTYRE: I do.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Scott thought
I should do it the other way around.

MS. McINTYRE: I think it is going to make it even more difficult for the Attorney General if you make a decision and then go and ask for direction as to whether or not you are right.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, supposing he comes back and says, all right, I don't know, your the one yourre the judge, you're the one that is suppose to know.

MS. McINTYRE: Well, sir, if he won't give you direction you're going to have to make a decision and the parties before you will have to act on that decision as they see fit.

I'm sorry I can't be of any further assistance to you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Knazan, can you solve all this problem for us?

MR. KNAZAN: No, I have no submissions.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

Mr. Labow, you've got a solution I take it?

MR. LABOW: Not a solution, Mr.

Commissioner.





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THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, all right.

MR. SOPINKA: Since these parties aren't going to be involved in Phase II --

MR. LABOW: Don't be that presumptious Mr. Sopinka.

easier to hear them than it is to argue with them, argue the question. Now, that's why I am doing it.

MR. SOPINKA: Well, can you put them on a time limit?

THE COMMISSIONER: I think Ms. McIntyre - Mr. Knazan was excellent, you can't complain about him and Ms. McIntyre certainly wasn't long:

MR. LABOW: Mr. Commissioner, as much as the parents that we represent would like you to hear all the evidence so that they can be clear as to what went on not only in the Hospital but once the police investigation began and the prosecution began I must agree with Mr. Percival's interpretation that you have to look at the Court of Appeal Decision as affecting the entire Commission.

The fact that they are split up into two hases is not something that the Lieutenant Governor in Council did but rather something that we did on our own for convenience and also so that the



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public would not perceive that evidence relating to one question, that being how and by what means the children died, also related to the second question and vice versa.

Because of that I feel that the Court of Appeal Decision has affect on both portions because it is really only one Commission. There may be two distinct inquiries as Mr. Sopinka set out, but it is all in your terms of reference and it is one proceeding.

While the Attorney General when he introduced this Commission made it clear that it should be very public and hopefully it would answer a number of questions, although it may not answer all of them, and therefore, he wanted a full public inquiry, it seems clear to me that the Court of Appeal Decision has left you inan impossible position regarding Phase II and that you really have very little to do because you cannot, I submit, hear evidence that you cannot report on.



The submission that you can hear the evidence and that you can do a number of things, although the Court of Appeal Decision is there facing you, I feel is not a correct interpretation. They made it very clear, notwithstanding the submissions made to them and your own decision that you can not make a number of findings and choose not to make other findings of fact, that you don't have that discretion, that the only thing that you can't do according to their decision, is name names and it would seem to me that that would apply as much in Phase II, as it does in Phase I.

Those are really all our submissions on that issue, Mr. Commissioner, but I would like to state that until we understand the scope of Phase II I, for one, am in no position to argue whether we want status or whether we should have status in Phase II. If I knew or had an idea where you were intending to go and if I thought that Phase II was going to deal with certain areas then I can tell you that we would be asking for status to look into certain aspects of the police investigation and the conducting of the prosecution, but until we know what is going to go on I don't feel we are in any position to do that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Could you not argue



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it on the basis of the one most favourable to your status?

MR. LABOW: I could do that and I am quite prepared to do that. It is not a very long argument.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, but I would like you to do that, because I would like to get that over with. I would like anybody, and it would obviously be this afternoon that we would do that, but just assume a most favourable position and argue for status and we will see. We may have to have further argument. I don't want to have to go through that problem again.

MR. LABOW: I will do that. I have no problem with that.

I would

also like to suggest that you might go back to the Lieutenant Governor in Council in order to try and clarify this issue, because in your original terms I thought it was quite clear that the Lieutenant Governor in Council had indicated there was a need for the parents of the deceased children and the public to be informed of all evidence, not only to the deaths,



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but in that same sentence, also to the proceedings arising therefrom.

I know that my clients would still like the opportunity to know exactly what went on with regard to the proceedings arising therefrom and any clarification from the Lieutenant Governor in Council or amendment to these terms would be most welcome.


one of the reasons why I would like to hear the arguments now on this are that I am thinking of Court proceedings. I may decide that you have no interest, no direct or substantial interest.

MR. LABOW: I understand that.

THE COMMISSIONER: If that is so and if you decide to dispute this matter in the Courts I want that to be done immediately so that this problem, I will not be faced with this problem when we finally get around to Phase II. I want to get as many of these problems cleared out of the way as possible.

MR. LABOW: I understand that, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: I am setting aside this afternoon for anyone. I have given, I hope,



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notice to everyone and there may be some other people, besides those who are here, who want to come in and I want to be able to consider that so I can decide that and get that out of the way and while we are arguing Phase -- or contemplating the argument for Phase I, and perhaps while I am even writing the first chapters of Phase I, the Courts can have that little task to be set aside and to be resolved. All right.

MR. LABOW: Thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

Mr. Tobias, you are next.

MR. TOBIAS: Mr. Commissioner, I can adopt much of what my friends, who have preceded me, have already said this morning.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can't adopt it all, I can tell you that. You have to take one side or the other.

MR. TOBIAS: I think it would be rather difficult, given the rather competing points of view that have been put forward, to adopt it all, but I would like to specifically agree with Mr. Percival. I think in fairness the Court of Appeal Decision clearly has to be applied to Phase II and to the considerations in Phase II in exactly the



same manner in which it was applied to Phase I.

I didn't read the Court of Appeal Decisions, as laying down different rules with respect to the two Phases.

Mr. Scott engaged you this morning in a brief discussion about hypothetically the question of the conduct of the nurses and I was concerned about one observation that was made. Clearly I think if you were to make comments upon any of the conduct of any group, including the nurses in Phase II, that could very directly affect them, as a group, with respect to criminal liability, because I have always understood that it was open for a party who refused to cooperate if they have gone far enough in that refusal to be charged with Obstruction of Justice.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I think you have to take some actual outright step. I don't think -- I have never heard of anyone, merely by declining to assist, being charged with either criminal or civil responsibility or it could even be classified as misconduct. I don't know, however, I will have to argue that out with Miss McIntyre.

MR. TOBIAS: With that one issue, sir, perhaps I might have been hearing wrong for the past three of four months, but I could have sworn that on



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
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numerous occasions there was some innuendo that perhaps some pact was made or some covenant was made or some active step was taken to put forward a particular story, but let me move on.

THE COMMISSIONER: I have asked that that be clarified.

MR. TOBIAS: I just wanted to make the point that I think their interests are affected as well.

With respect to the comments that have been made about hearing all of the evidence and your observation that, yes, but that only applied to the cause of death, I think it is important to note that they were really as a result of your original ruling, two issues in Phase 1. Not only how did the babies come to their death, but if you could on the evidence express a conclusion, who might be implicated in that death. So I think it was fair game, once the Court of Appeal Decision came down, to say, well, we can still hear all the evidence as long as we don't name a name. It is almost impossible to do that in Phase II, because, sir, as I perceive it, Phase II has one issue and one issue only and that is the conduct of the police and the Crown Attorneys in their investigation and their



prosecution of charges against Mr. Sopinka's client.

It is obvious that at this stage we have all done a marvellous job in indentifying the problem, but I don't think anyone has proposed a solution.

I don't certainly have a solution. But I would like to point out, though, something Mr. Justice Krever said in the Divisional Court. In the opening line of his judgement he made the observation:

" It was hard to imagine any case in which the competing interests of the various parties could clash more resoundingly. "

If we needed any reminder of that we have certainly seen it here this morning.

It is clear to me that Mr. Percival's position, on the one hand, and Mr. Sopinka's position, on the other hand, are entirely at cross purposes and can't possibly co-exist, so that your dilemma, as I see it, is that you simply cannot proceed without some kind of clarification. You can't even begin to hear the evidence without some kind of clarification and you have two choices as to how you can get that clarification. You can make a ruling, and I would imagine that either way you will be asked to state a case and ultimately it is something that the Court



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of Appeal will rule on, which clearly is not a happy thing to contemplate when you stop to think of the time, the delay and the cost involved in that, or you can, as you suggested this morning, go back to the source, to the Lieutenant Governor in Council and you can ask him to clarify.

Now, other than adopting those two approaches the only thing, the only other thing you can do, as I see it, would be to advise the Lieutenant Governor in Council that, given the language contained in the Terms of Reference, and given the conundrum created by your reading of the Court of Appeal Decision, that you can't proceed and you can't make any report with respect to Phase II and, in fairness, I don't think that is an attractive alternative either.

It has been suggested here that
perhaps you should make a ruling and then ask the
Lieutenant Governor in Council to give clarification.

My concern on that point is that were you to do that
you would, in effect, almost be asking the Attorney
General to serve in some sort of an appellant function.

If you make a ruling and that ruling needs clarification,
clearly the people to give you that kind of direction
and that kind of clarification in this proceeding would



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be the Divisional Court and beyond that the Court of Appeal.

I have nothing other than that I can usefully add, except to say to Mr. Sopinka that if there is no Phase II he may not have standing either. Thank you, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right, thank you. Now , Mr. Shanahan.

MR. SHANAHAN: Mr. Tobias, having gone before me, sir, I think I can adopt what he has said here. This afternoon on that other issue I will ask to go before him.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shinehoft.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I intend to be very brief, Mr. Commissioner, as I usually am, especially with Mr. Sopinka beside me.

MR. SOPINKA: Very good, you are learning.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I would like to allude to something that I did refer to before in our previous discussion and that is in regard to the Court of Appeal Decision, which part of that Decision is obiter dicta and which part of that decision might be construed as ratio decidendi.

I argued at that time that I felt it



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would be important to make that distinction and I still say that. There are certain things that are discussed here, certain—issues that are raised here that were never even argued in the Court of Appeal, so how can one say that certain parts of a Judgement of the Court of Appeal are applicable to the second part, or Phase II, when the issues were never raised in the Court of Appeal?

Secondly, the question is if you are so restricted in what you can do in Phase II, and I think you have put it fairly, what is the purpose and sense of Phase II if it is merely a recitation of facts and information that has been brought out in previous proceedings or if it is what some people might construe as glorified Examinations for Discovery,

and a malicious prosecution, then it serves no use at all.

I would say, thirdly, Mr. Commissioner, that I agree wholeheartedly with the people that have come before you and said to you, let us ask the Attorney General for clarification of the issues and what did he mean by the Order in Council. There is one other possibility as well. That is to go back to the Court of Appeal. My submission is that they are not yet functus.



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THE COMMISSIONER: I think the Order has not been taken out; is that right?

MR. SHINEHOFT: My understanding is I certainly haven't approved any Order.

would receive it, I may be wrong. I don't think they would consider that, because the matter was not put before them and they would say that they want to have they would have a right to say that they want to have the benefit of my reasons and they would want to have the benefit of the Divisional Court's reasons. It is an entirely different issue before they decide on it. I would think that would be the answer.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I say this, Mr.

Commissioner: you have come here and you have said that I have got a problem and we agreed that you have got a problem. I am saying to you that there are certain avenues, certain approaches that we might be able to take to help us resolve this problem and surely if the Court of Appeal would entertain further argument or would give further clarification to their Judgement on what exactly they meant, as far as the applicability of the Judgement, vis-a-vis Phase I and Phase II, then this would, in my respectful submission, help you very much in trying to frame



exactly what the decision might be.

THE COMMISSIONER: It would more than help me, it would tell me. I don't think they would do it, that is all.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Well, I think there is a phrase, "There's no harm in asking."

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't know.

would suggest, and I agree with the predecessors
before you this morning, that we should ask the
Attorney General for clarification and this should
be done before a decision is made by yourself and
hopefully this can be done in a very expeditious manner
and that if amendments have to be made to the Order
in Council that they can be made so that we can
continue on with Phase II, because the public and
the parents have a huge investment in these proceedings
to date and it would be a shame, indeed, if a full
hearing could not be made, as to exactly what happened.

Those are my submissions.





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THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right. Before I call on Mr. Lamek I want to ask Mr. Percival a question, what is your view of going back to the Attorney General?

MR. PERCIVAL: Mr. Commissioner, back on April 18th I asked you perhaps that could be something you might do with respect to Phase I.

THE COMMISSIONER: But not having done it with respect to Phase I. The reason I didn't do it with respect to Phase I was that Mr. Hunt argued against that in the Court of Appeal, and that was a useless exercise.

MR. PERCIVAL: If you didn't do it, with respect to Phase I why would you do it with respect to Phase II.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is a good rhetorical question and I have no answer to it. All right. Now Mr. Lamek.

MR. LAMEK: Mr. Commissioner, I first of all am instructed by Miss Cronk to resist Miss Chown's suggestion that we have some of the statements of prima facie facts whatever happens in Phase II.

Mr. Commissioner, with the best will in the world I don't think I can be of very much assistance to you. I don't have the answer to this.



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Indeed I don't propose to take a position about What is permissible in Phase II under the Terms of Reference as they have been construed by the Court of Appeal.

I have listened to the debate and I am obliged to say I see merit and defects in both of the opposing positions that have been advanced to you.

It does seem to me at this stage, sir, that before embarking on Phase II one really needs to consider not what may eventually prove to be the correct view of your mandate, but really what is practical.

The question of the appropriate scope of enquiry and reporting Phase I arose at a time when we were well into the Phase and the evidence. We are about to embark on something rather new, and in my submission it makes a great deal of sense to map out, if possible, where we are going before we set out.

In my submission it is indeed arguable, as Mr. Sopinka has suggested, that the Court of Appeal Judgment should be read as applying primarily to Phase I, and not as a blanket prohibition against the naming of names, or against commenting on the conduct of persons in Phase II, subject of course to the injunction that is contained in the Terms of Reference which applies equally to paragraphs 3 and 4



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of the Terms of Reference.

Indeed I might say that seems to have been assumed from the start long before the naming of names became an issue in Phase I, that you were indeed permitted to comment in Phase II about the inadequacy, or inadequacy of propriety, or impropriety of the actions of the police and the Crown Attorneys when you came to Phase II.

The approach of not only my learned friend Mr. Percival, but Mr. Hunt as well, seemed to be premised upon that long before the issue had been squarely raised. I do see the argument that has been advanced primarily by Mr. Sopinka as being an arguable position.

I have to concede also Mr. Commissioner, in my submission, it is also arguable and of course, this is a concern that you have expressed, that the effect of the Court of Appeal Judgment is to prevent your making any comment lauditory or adverse on the conduct of persons in Phase II. That you are restricted to hearing evidence only as to what was done in order that you may compile a chronology of events.

One might properly wonder whether such utility to the public as that exercise might have



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justified the use of your time and talents and the cost of doing it.

At the end of the day in my submission it comes to this, that each of those positions is arguable, but unless there is either consensus or clarification as to exactly what you may or may not do, to embark upon Phase II is clearly to invite dispute, delay and bluntly, frustration. Mr. Percival has forthrightly; given notice of his intention and I recognize the force of his position and the validity of his position. He is maintaining an eminently arguable position and he is prepared to have it tested. One cannot possibly be critical of him for letting it be known that he proposes to have it tested if it comes to this.

Therefore, Mr. Commissioner, to embark on Phase II without clarification is to do what we all advise our clients not to do, is essentially to buy a law suit. To proceed in the constant state of uncertainty would not in my respect ful submission be sensible. I know it was in the hope that the uncertainty might be removed that you invited all Counsel to make submissions to you today. There clearly is a full range of views as to what you may or may not do, and sadly there is no prospect of a





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consensus among all Counsel. There is little point in my stating a view as to what the possible scope of Phase II is in my view.

As I have said any such position would be no more than arguable. It is my submission it would be unwise to proceed on such a course. Whether clarification be sought by request to the Lieutenant Governor in Council or by the stating of a case on your own motion, sir, under the Public Enquiry Act, is a matter that will be debated and which at the end of the day you may perhaps resolve.

In my submission if it is possible to clarify the permitted scope of the enquiry before embarking upon it, it should be done. The positions as I have listened to them today are irreconcilable, and in that situation to embark upon Phase II would be to embark upon what surely is a very short lived exercise before we find ourselves elsewhere seeking the clarification which might as well be sought now.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right.

Thank you. Now Mr. Sopinka and Mr. Hunt I promised you a last short word.

MR. SOPINKA: Yes, I won't be very long. I submit that the cleanest way for you to decide this is that the Court of Appeal Judgment does





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not apply to Phase II, and Phase II is different in the manner in which I have indicated, and the names are known; that you can determine the circumstances even though that may result by reason of the circumstances of persons being identified. You would not be identifing them. You have mentioned on a couple of occasions that there is no corollary issue in Phase II. In my submission there is.

You can't determine the circumstances surrounding the investigation, institution and prosecution of the charges.

Now in Phase I you can determine how and by what means the children came to their death. The responsibility would be fixed by you if you identify the perpetrator, that is what the Court of Appeal said.

In Phase II the mere fact that the names are known; if you merely determine the circumstances of the investigation you would not be determining the criminal or civil responsibility. The Order in Council says that you are not to determine that. The mere fact that people know that so and so did this would not mean that you - the prohibition is against you and your report.

THE COMMISSIONER: Even though I rejected



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that at the beginning in Phase I. I can't just simply say that because my decision will not be binding upon the parties, therefore I can make any decision I like. Even I projected that in my Reasons and the Court of Appeal rejected it again. I can't say the police were sloppy, or even that they were malicious, I can't say any of those things, because it will surely be a finding of fact, at least in my reading of it, a finding of law, if I said anything like that. What the Court of Appeal is saying, if I say in practice that it constitutes a finding of law, with or without the statement of law, then I have gone too far.

MR. SOPINKA: Yes, but that is only if you express an opinion as to who did it. The prohibition, and I think this has been lost sight of, is that you are not to express any conclusion of law regarding civil or criminal responsibility. Now if you say something in your report that in itself does not amount to a conclusion, but because people know other circumstances, you are not expressing any conclusion, other people are drawing the conclusions.

THE COMMISSIONER: You are asking me to be sneaky.

MR. SOPINKA: No, I am not. I am asking you to interpret, with respect, I am not suggesting



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
there is anything sneaky about that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well it certainly is if I say - if I tried to sneak it in in some way so only the subtle reader can follow it.

MR. SOPINKA: I am not suggesting any reader. You are prohibited in your report from expressing a conclusion of law respecting civil or criminal responsibility.

In Phase I, if you determined questions of fact that were germane to a criminal prosecution, or a civil action and named names, you would then be expressing a conclusion of law in your report.

Now in Phase II, it so happens that the circumstances are that the names are known. The Attorney General or the Lieutenant Governor in Council knew that when they drafted this thing. So they obviously did not intend for it to be a completely barren examination. So when they determined that you were to report on the circumstances surrounding the investigation, obviously they intended that you could relate those circumstances as long as you did not express any conclusion of law in civil or criminal responsibility. So I say there is a corollary matters in Phase II, and that is that you can deal with the circumstances. It so happens that





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those circumstances may lead the public to conclude that certain people did it, but they might have done it in Phase I too. As has been pointed out there are a limited number of nurses involved. If you said it was murder, they might conclude that in that case too. In fact there are probably more persons involved in Phase II than there were in Phase I that were in the category of suspects.

Now I think Mr. Scott's argument, although he didn't intend this, demonstrates that the Court of Appeal could not have been intending their Judgment to apply to Phase II. He referred you to page 15 of the Decision in which the Court of Appeal appears to have said that you don't have a discretion to exclude certain elements from your findings. That if the evidence warrants finding that there was a certain state of mind relating to the cause of death, etc, then you were to make that finding.

Now given the facts that the names were known, surely they could not have been intending that to apply to Phase II and still say that you can't determine criminal responsibility. Because if the argument is right that the fact that the names are known, even though you don't put them in your



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report, and then you make a finding of fact, if that amounts to determination of civil or criminal responsibility; then what the Court of Appeal, if they intended that to apply to Phase II, have said, you are to determine criminal responsibility in Phase II.

Because they knew that the names were known. If they say well you have got to determine intent if it is warranted in the evidence, they would really have been saying in Phase II that you have to determine criminal responsibility and obviously that would not have been their intent and that demonstrates that they didn't intend that to apply to Phase II.

Now as to the approach to the Attorney General, may I say with respect that I agree with Mr. Scott that what you have to do is determine what the Order in Council says. Because I do not think that you should - or I submit that you should not ask the Attorney General or the Lieutenant Governor in Council for clarification.

THE COMMISSIONER: Can't I say that regardless of what I decide we are heading into the Courts unless he clarifies it because this is what is going to happen. If I decide, if I decide that


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the Court of Appeal Decision does apply to Phase II as well as Phase I, then I may well find that - I am sorry if I find that it applies to both then I may well find that you are dissatisfied in that and you may haul me before the Divisional Court for appropriate disciplinary procedures.





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And if I decide the other way Mr.

Percival is going to take me there.

Now, it may not be immediate, you withold your fire until the first question on cross-examination but it is going to come sometime and isn't it better to tell him this is what we are heading for, we are heading for at least a six month delay and, I might add, I wouldn't have any of the inh bitions about going to the Supreme Court of Canada if we haven't had any of the evidence and we hadn't started with the whole procedure either.

So, if the decision was not according to my taste but the other problem is I may find myself forced to make a decision in this matter that goes against the grain as what I would like to have happen.

MR. SOPINKA:

I have the

solutation .

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MRL SOPINKA: Because I suggest that if you go to the Attorney General first of all and say I haven't decided what this means but clarify it he will probably say, well, there is a machinery in the Public Inquiries Act for having these matters



dealt with, I don't get into the act until that has been exhausted. He might not say that. Supposing he doesn't say that and comes back and clarifies it I might be dissatisfied with the clarification, we might still go to the Divisional Court and then look at the position the Court is in.

THE COMMISSIONER: But you can't go to the Court. If it is clarified, you can't ask the Divisional Court to upset what the Lieutenant Governor and Council decided.


MR. SOPINKA: Well then, I will come and say --

THE COMMISSIONER: You can ask but you won't get it, I can tell you that. No, you can get me reversed but you can't get the Lieutenant Governor in Council reversed.

MR. SOPINKA: No, because I will do it through you. When he comes back and says this is what it means I will say no it doesn't. He's not the court. Unless he amends the Order in Council --

THE COMMISSIONER: He will have to amend it, there is no point. His expression opinion, while extremely valuable, is not anything that is going to bind me.

MR. SOPINKA: Well, we are in agreement.



What you should do is ask him to amend.

THE COMMISSIONER: Ask him to amend.

MR. SOPINKA: To do what you say should be done in this inquiry; in other words there is ample precedent for a Commissioner asking for the terms of reference to be amended to deal with the subject in the way that it appears it should be dealt with, the Commissioner now being in a better position perhaps then the Attorney General to determine how the subject should be dealt with and there is ample precedent of that being done, the terms of reference being extended.

I agree with you that I don't think it is essential for you to make a decision, although, it might be rather difficult to tell him to extend an Order in Council when you haven't told him how you think it is limited.

THE COMMISSIONER: I will send him the transcript.

MR. SOPINKA: You see, he may say to you, well, why should I extend it, you haven't told me it's limited.

THE COMMISSIONER: I will tell you what, I will ask Mr. Hunt to whisper in his ear what the problem is and maybe he will get through.



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MR. SOPINKA: So, it should be made clear that it is an amendment to the terms of reference to clarify it so as to enable this to be a full and meaningful inquiry into those circumstances. You know, we have been hearing about the police being placed in jeopardy, I don't know whether this comes from a sense of guilt or what, but if it goes the other way it is just as serious for my client.

MR. PERCIVAL: With respect, that is a little bit much, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: I agree. Well, I know, but we are being a little frivolous today sometimes and I can understand that.

MR. SOPINKA: But in other words it works both ways. If you determine in Phase II -It is just as serious for my client and I am prepared to take the risk. If you say they were perfectly justified in laying the charges that impacts on her rights as well as the police.

point is that the perpetrators, if there are such people, have been protected, the police have not, that's all. If you interpret it one way that's what's going to happen.

MR. SOPINKA: Well, they may have been



protected by not having the perpetrators in Phase I identified, they might have charged the wrong perpetrator. I'm not so sure that was a bad thing for them.

Those are my submissions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right.

Thank you. Mr. Hunt, do you have anything to add?

MR. HUNT: I have nothing to add, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, thank

you. Well, I think we will rise now and we will see what the position is at, I guess, 2:30 we will see what the position is on representation. I know it seems premature but I want to get that problem resolved to before we start.

Now, it is not going to hold up Phase
II that much no matter what happens because we have
still a lot of work to do in Phase I. Whether we have
any more witnesses or not, I want people to be
preparing argument, argument has to be given. If we
haven't got Phase II resolved at that point then I
have a task before me that can keep me occupied and
out of trouble until we do.

Yes.

MR. TOBIAS: Mr. Commissioner, I'm shaking my head because with respect to my friend,



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Mr. Labow, he may have conceded too much. I really have a great deal of difficulty in deciding in my own mind not only how I can argue the question of standing in Phase II but how I can even get intelligent instructions from my clients. I am at a complete loss as to what Phase II is?

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I asked you to assume the one that is most favourable to your position, your request for a standing. That I'm going to ask you to do because I want to get this problem resolved.

Anyway, let's fight about it at 2:30 this afternoon.

MR. TOBIAS: All right.

--- Lunch Recess





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--- Upon resuming at 2:30 p.m.

THE COMMISSIONER: Now, I suppose the first question I should ask, I had assumed that Susan Nelles, the Attorney General, and the police and perhaps the Hospital are seeking standing in Phase II, am I correct?

> MR. HUNT: Yes.

MR. BROWN: Yes.

MR. ROLAND: Certainly that is

correct, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I won't ask you to argue unless someone opposes that application. Does anyone have any opposition to the application of those four parties?

Now, can I hear from anyone else who seeks standing?

MS. RAE: Yes.

MS. CHOWN: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right,

Miss Chown.


MS. CHOWN: I don't know whether you're

including me in that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I wasn't,

really.

MS. CHOWN: I simply come before you



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to say that at the moment like everyone else I do not have knowledge as to whether --

THE COMMISSIONER: Assume.

MS. CHOWN: Assuming that the police are going to make reference to information they expected to receive from the doctors and did not or information they received from the doctors and acted on and perhaps to their detriment, it strikes me that my clients will be involved. They were certainly involved, numerous of them, in police interviews.


THE COMMISSIONER: No question that if any of your clients attend on Phase II, although most of your clients were questioned both on Phase I and Phase II I think, were they not?

MS. CHOWN: I think the line was drawn fairly carefully with the doctors and we didn't get too much into Phase II.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, you are quite right, you are quite right. We started I think with the nurses, didn't we?

MS. CHOWN: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you will have to be present but do they have, in the issue itself, do they have any, what is it, substantial and direct



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interest? 'Substantial and direct interest in the subject matter of this Inquiry.'

What would be your concern? I wonder. the famous question I was to put to Mr. Hunt and to Mr. Young, are we going to have an answer on it or not?

MR. HUNT: I am certainly prepared to give you the answer as much as I can but I don't think it is going to be that helpful.


THE COMMISSIONER: That helpful.

MR. HUNT: No, maybe not.

MR. ROLAND: Sir, before the answer is given I am a little concerned at the question and I am more alarmed if there is going to be an answer, if it is critical of any of the individuals that were employed at the Hospital and they are named or the Institution itself and it is named, in Mr. Hunt, or Mr. Percival, or Mr. Young in his place, setting out their theory of Phase II, you asked them to set out their theory of Phase II in order to assist you in deciding on standing of various individuals.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's right.

MR. ROLAND: And you have asked them to come before you and flush out that theory and I take it in the course of doing so they



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will indentify individuals or groups of individuals and their criticism, if they have any, of those individuals or groups in the course of the investigation.

Now, I am concerned if that is done in public - I am not concerned if it is done incamera but I am concerned if it is done in public, as things stand today, because we don't know what the ambit of Phase II is going to be and it may be very unfair to those individuals to be named publicly today in criticism of them, although, they may never have a chance to answer that criticism. I am concerned that the prejudice that that may cause in a public forum such as this.

So that I am interested in knowing what their answer to the question is, I think it should not be in public.

MR. YOUNG: Mr. Commissioner, let me say that should my friend not have addressed that point, I would have. We have similar concerns and I don't mean to be difficult but I don't think it would be fair for us to outline our theory and who indeed needs to be present because that's tantamount to saying that those individuals might have done something wrong.

THE COMMISSIONER: Are you satisfied to have all Counsel present when you address this?



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MR. YOUNG: Sure, I have no problem with that, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, is there anyone here who is seeking standing who has not had standing in Phase I?

Well, no one seems to be, so, we have no problem that way.

Well, I guess if I had thought this out. There are so many things that if I had just thought things out ahead of time it would have made things a lot easier and we would have met someplace else at 2:30 instead of here.

Yes, Mr. Tobias?

MR. TOBIAS: The parents and some of the other people are going to be in a very similar kind of difficulty. You have asked us to argue based upon certain assumptions that the way the Terms of Reference are going to be interpreted are in the most favourable light.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. TOBIAS: Now, when I get into that
I may inadvertently be telling you something about my
thoughts and my theories and naming certain individuals,
or at least certain Institutions, and I am also
concerned that I not do them any public prejudice.



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For that reason, it occurred to me that perhaps it would have been better had we had these arguments in-camera.

THE COMMISSIONER: All arguments? We have the whole question of standing done in-camera, is that what you're suggesting?

MR. TOBIAS: Well, I am suggesting it would certainly help in answering my fears about doing prejudice to people whom I may find it necessary to refer to and try to communicate to you why I think my particular clients have some substantial and direct interest in Phase II.

MR. SHANAHAN: Well, sir, if I might on behalf of those whom I represent. I can see the problems Mr. Roland and Mr. Young are addressing themselves to and that prejudice should perhaps be protected by those questions being made clear perhaps in-camera. But I want to be fair that from my part, in addressing the issue whether my client should have standing in Phase II, I distinctly wish it here, I wish it to be on the public record and I want to be clear on that, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Miss McIntyre?

MS. MCINTYRE: Sir, since the allegations with respect to Phase II to a large extent have already



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been made public against that, I am not as concerned about that but that I would certainly want arguments on standing to be made in public.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, supposing we have the questions answered in-camera, which will take I would think at the most two or three minutes, am I right? And even with questions that I will be putting to Mr. Hunt to try and tell me once again to see if I understand it, even with all of those it would just take us not more than ten minutes and then we could come back here and argue for standing and all I would be able to do is try to remember.

Now, obviously, Counsel are going to have to be able to speak to their clients to take instructions because of what their position is.


Has anybody any wild objection to that procedure?

MR. YOUNG: Sir?

THE COMMISSIONER: You do?

MR. YOUNG: No, I don't object to this but I know you are not going to be too fond of this comment. Might I suggest that we are a little premature at this stage.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, you are quite right. We are premature except for this fact that it





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is an issue that is going to be raised and I would like it to be raised and get it out of the way as soon as possible, otherwise, we are looking at 1999 for the commencement of Phase II.

MR. YOUNG: Unfortunately whether or not we discuss this this afternoon, I am not certain whether it is going to start before 1999. I don't mean that in a facetious way. I think we have some serious obstacles to overcome and we have some serious questions and I simply suggest that perhaps we have this discussion next week, I think it would not take more than an hour or two next week and that may be a more appropriate time and we may have a better idea of how Phase II is going to proceed. I will leave that with you, sir.



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THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry. You can leave it with me, but I don't understand it. Tell me what it is you are saying?

MR. YOUNG: I guess I am hopeful, sir, that we will have some sort of judgement from you by that stage.

THE COMMISSIONER: Nobody is going to pay any attention to my judgement, so what difference does that make?

> MR. YOUNG: They liked your last one. THE COMMISSIONER: No, they didn't.

MR. YOUNG: We did. I'm hoping that might limit some of the options if, in fact we know there is not going to be a full Phase II or there is not going to be a full Phase II until we hear from the Lieutenant Governor or the Divisional Court then, in fact, there is certainly an urgency if, in fact, you are going to proceed in a limited form, well, then, indeed we have to stress the issue at the time.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Knazan.

MR. KNAZAN: I pose the question for

I have been sitting around waiting.

THE COMMISSIONER: You have something

MR. KNAZAN: Subject to the answer that





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| L | thought | were | coming | from | Mr. | Hunt | and | Mr. | Young. |
|---|---------|------|---------|--------|-------|------|-----|-----|--------|
| E | guess I | have | exposed | l myse | elf i | now. | | | |

THE COMMISSIONER: Are you, of all people, going to be asking for standing?

MR. KNAZAN: No I was not. I was anxious to hear --

MR. YOUNG: Should my friend have approached me earlier I would have been happy to explain this to him before.

MR. TOBIAS: Sir, I rise, because it matters not to the people that aren't going to be seeking standing when we have this argument. They have obviously already determined they can get on about their business after the conclusion of Phase I but the people who do not automatically --

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think it really matters to Mr. Knazan. I don't quite understand If he is not going to be seeking standing --

MR. TOBIAS: That is precisely the point, whereas the people who will or may be seeking standing by proceeding right now on the basis that you have outlined this morning are in a very very difficult position and I suggested we may serve everybodys interest by thinking about this a little bit more and putting it off for a week or so.



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As you pointed out this morning, we are clearly going to be engaged in Phase I matters, at least for the next couple of weeks at the very minimum.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I don't accept that at all.

MR. TOBIAS: Sir, if even we were to start argument next Monday morning.

mean. Certainly if that is what you mean, but it is not that. I want to be able to, as soon as the argument was finished in Phase I which has always been my intention, to start Phase II. The only way we could do that is to proceed with the problems in Phase II as soon as possible. If you sought standing and I were to deny you standing then I don't see how I can proceed with the matters until the questions have been resolved and I don't want to be bound by this in the Divisional Court if you were determined to have a case stated.

MR. TOBIAS: I am keenly aware of that problem. All I am saying is that the question that we have to decide today is does the one week affect us.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, by one week.



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MR. TOBIAS: You have indicated quite strongly that once you make a ruling that you would expect anyone who wanted to state their case in the court to do so expeditiously. All I am suggesting to you, I think the one week delay doesn't --

THE COMMISSIONER: I will accept that argument. The next thing is do we want to ask questions and get the answers in camera from Mr. Hunt. Do you want to say something?

MR. LAMEK: I don't know whether you want to do that now or not. If you do I can tell you that the hearing room three is available right now.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, why don't
we then just get the statement. It will not be published
by anyone, but we will at least have that so that people
can think about it and we will reserve until after I
have done whatever I am going to do which is going
to be next week on the arguments we had this morning.
All right? It won't be long. I wonder if there is
another job available then. Court Room 3 is?

MR. LAMEK: Hearing room number three on the 21st floor.

THE COMMISSIONER: For anyones benefit we are retired until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning,

I'm sorry, 10:30 tomorrow morning.

---Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 2:40 p.m. to an in camera hearing following immediately.



